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Transmission, Power Pools, and Competition
in the Electric Utility Industry
By JAMES F. FAIRMAN* and JOHN C. SCOTT**
Introduction
Congress has declared
that the business of transmitting and selling electric energy for
ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest,
and Federal regulation ...of that part of such business which
consists of the transmission of electric energy in interstate com-
merce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate com-
merce is necessary in the public interest.1
The Federal Power Commission has been charged with the responsi-
bility of promoting and encouraging interconnection and coordination
to assure "an abundant supply of electric energy throughout the United
States with the greatest possible economy and with regard to the proper
utilization and conservation of natural resources."2 The Federal Power
Act,3 the Atomic Energy Act,4 and the so-called "preference" laws re-
lating to the marketing of federal power 5 all bear on the question
whether and to what extent transmission of electric energy and power
pooling can be a matter of private agreement or public mandate. Com-
petition, coordination, and regulation all play a role6 in the nation's
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1. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1970).
2. Id. § 824a(a) (1970).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-825(r) (1970).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-282 (1970).
5. A list of federal preference statutes is set forth in note 110 infra.
6. See D. Penn, J. Delaney & T. Honeycutt, Coordination, Competition, and
Regulation in the Electric Utility Industry (1975) (unpublished, unofficial report pre-
largest industry which "provides essentially one single standard product-
electric power on instant demand."7
Background of the Problem
The structure, growth, technological changes, and future trend of
the electric utility industry have been thoroughly examined by the FPC
in its national power surveys of 1964 and 1970.8 Two of these ele-
ments-structure and technology-are of specific importance to the
subject under consideration. Access, by agreement or mandate, to
power pools and transmission services directly affects the traditional
marketing practices within the industry structureY
In its 1964 survey, the FPC emphasized the national concern that
planning and construction of generation and transmission facilities be
carried forward by all segments of the industry as part of the develop-
ment of large, coordinated power networks to gain the economies of
scale and the advantages of load diversities, declaring:
These considerations point up the Nation's interest in encouraging
every power generating system to look far beyond its own service
areas in its planning of new capacity and of interconnections for
capacity savings. . . .The Nation can afford no less.10
However, the 1964 survey acknowledged that the industry's
pluralistic institutional structure inhibits the goal of coordinated oper-
ations, since
rivalries and controversies between segments of the industry
[have] frequently resulted in economically meaningless boundaries
for utility system planning and operation which undoubtedly cost
the power consumers of this country millions of dollars every year
in wasted opportunities for cost reduction."
pared by members of the Economic Analysis Section of the Office of Antitrust and
Indemnity, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, on file with the authors) [hereinafter cited
as Penn, Delaney & Honeycutt].
7. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, 1970 NATIONAL POWER SURVEY, pt. I, ch. 1,
at 10 [hereinafter cited as 1970 POWER SURVEY].
8. 1970 POWER SURVEY, supra note 7; FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, NATIONAL
POWER SURVEY (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964 POWER SURVEY].
9. "The ownership of transmission lines can be used to impose more monopoly
in generation or more vertical integration on the power industry, or both, than is tech-
nically necessary." Weiss, Antitrust in the Electric Power Industry in PROMOTING COM-
PETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS 135, 144-45 (A. Phillips, ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited
as Weiss]. "The physical limits on the size of the [bulk power] market are set by
transmission costs." Id. at 136.
10. 1964 POWER SURVEY, supra note 8, at 3 (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 5. The survey took the position that such boundaries could be
"transcended" if ideological differences were not a bar to working together to establish
stronger power pools which "would strengthen all and diminish none." Id.
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The survey identified areas of controversy in the industry, including
"territorial integrity" of retail marketing areas, yardstick competition
afforded by public power programs, dissimilarities in tax, financing and
earning requirements, and statutory preference to public and cooper-
ative power distributors in the sale of federal power. The FPC felt
these problems were not "insuperable barriers," declaring that "[t]he
opportunities afforded by our technology are not the special province
of any segment of the industry."' 2
This juxtaposition of a declared national policy-shared technol-
ogy-and the countervailing rivalries within the institutional struc-
ture of the utility industry13 is -the background against which to examine
the role of power transmission and pooling. The issues to be addressed
are: (1) how do systems obtain and coordinate power supplies; (2)
how do existing federal laws, policy, and regulatory supervision relate
to power pools and transmission services; and (3) what lies ahead-
is the availability of transmission and power pool services to be a private
contractual matter or an obligation required by national objectives?
The Need for Competition
Before examining whether existing pooling and transmission ar-
rangements allow sufficient competition in the electric utility industry,
it is important to consider whether real competition is feasible or desir-
able. Because the electric power industry is subjected to considerable
regulation, 4 it has been argued that there is no possibility of compe-
tition. 5 However, the feasibility of competition in the electric utility in-
12. Id. A comparable view has been codified in the Atomic Energy Act, which
declares the policy of the United States to be "the development, use and control of
atomic energy" so as to "improve the general welfare, increase the standard of living,
and strengthen free competition in private enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2011(b) (1970).
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has stated the act's intention to be "that the origi-
nal public control should not be permitted to develop into a private monopoly. ... "
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 6 A.E.C. 619, 620 (1973).
13. See 1970 PoWER SuRvy, supra note 7, pt. I, ch. 1, at 12.
14. Retail rates of electric utilities are regulated by forty-six state commissions.
Sixteen have authority to regulate rates of local publicly owned electric utilities and
twenty-five have authority to regulate rates of rural electric cooperatives. See FEERAL
POWaER COMMISSION, FEDERAL AND STATE COMMISSION JURISDICTION AND REGULATION
OF ELECmRic, GAS, AND TELEPHONE UTILITIES (1973). In addition to state regulation,
various aspects of utility operations are subject to regulation by the Federal Power Com-
mission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Atomic Energy Commission, and
the Environmental Protection Agency. 1970 POWER SURvEy, supra note 7, pt. I, ch.
2, at 9-11.
15. "[Clertain industries were originally subjected to government regulation in
the belief that effective competition was neither economically feasible nor socially de-
dustry has been demonstrated. While opportunities to compete for
residential and commercial retail customers are almost entirely
limited to an occasional new housing development or shopping center
accessible to two or more utilities, 16  competition for retail industrial
customers is not at all uncommon. 17  More significant for purposes of
this study is the feasibility of competition at the wholesale level-in
the sale to other utilities of the several types of power supply services
whose exchange is essential to realization of the economies associated
with interconnection and coordination of systems.
Another type of competition capable of serving the public interest
through efficient use of resources has been called "yardstick" compe-
tition. This term is meant to identify the competitive pressure felt
by a utility as a consequence of lower rates or superior service of a
neighboring utility even when the two systems are legally or practically
prevented from competing for customers.' s Its survival depends to
sirable. Recently, however, the pace of technological change has rendered obsolete
much of this traditional dichotomy." Stelzer, Antitrust and Regulatory Policies: An
Introduction and Overview, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 669, 673 (1971). Traditional eco-
nomic analysis has justified reliance on regulation as a substitute for competition, where
an industry is a natural monopoly, or is crucially important in terms of size and eco-
nomic impact on the economy, or where competition would be inefficient and perhaps
destructive in an industry. See Shenefield, Annual Survey of Antitrust Developments-
The Year of the Regulated Industry, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1, 2 (1974). It has
also been suggested that utilities could operate under either regulation or enforced com-
petition, but that it is improper to apply both to the industry. Address by Herbert
Cohn, The Rationale and Benefits of Regulation, Second General Session of the Meet-
ing of the Section of Public Utility Law, American Bar Association, Aug. 10, 1976,
in ABA, PUBLIC UTILITY LAW 21 (1976) (reprinted from PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY,
Oct. 7, 1976).
16. Two commentators disagree with the prevailing view that there could be no
competition in distribution, and discuss the values in those cities served by two compet-
ing distribution utilities. See Primeaux, A Reexamination of the Monopoly Market
Structure for Electric Utilities, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS
175 (A. Phillips ed. 1975); Hellman, Government Competition in the Electric Utility
Industry of the United States (1966) (on file with the authors).
17. Most industrial competition is an attempt to attract industries to an area. In-
dustries that use vast amounts of electricity may locate in or relocate to areas providing
low cost electric power. Industries with lower electrical needs, however, comprising
the vast bulk of utility customers, do not, as a rule, make locational decisions on the
basis of the availability of more or less expensive energy. Pace, Relevant Markets and
the Nature of Competition in the Electric Utility Industry, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 725,
734-44 (1971).
18. Three types of electric utilities distribute electricity at retail: investor owned
utilities, local publicly owned utilities, and rural electric cooperatives. The 405 investor
owned utilities range from the largest to the smallest in the nation. Two hundred of
the largest own and operate more than 75% of the generating capacity and serve about
80% of the customers in the country. Local publicly owned electric utilities include
state chartered public utility districts, often coinciding with county lines, and municipally
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some degree on survival of small systems, especially municipally
and cooperatively owned systems. Technological advancement has
allowed large systems to take advantage of economies of scale, often
to the disadvantage of their smaller neighboring utilities. Application
of antitrust principles to insure access to economies of scale and technol-
ogy offer small systems"9 an opportunity to survive and provide the in-
dustry with the stimulus of competition by comparison. Lower rates
of municipal and cooperative systems have frequently encouraged in-
vestor owned electric utilities to reduce their rates, partially to prevent
their retail customers from voting to establish a municipally owned
electric utility.20 Thus, the freedom of a political choice as to the na-
ture of the serving utility has encouraged the type of increased con-
owned electric utilities. They generate approximately 9% of total industry production
and serve about 13% of retail customers. Most of the municipally owned electric
utilities are small, distribution-only utilities, with 75% serving cities with populations of
under 10,000. Rural electric cooperatives range from less than 100 members to as
many as 35,000. They serve approximately 4.5% of retail electricity consumers and
generate about one percent of the national total. 1970 POWER SURVEY, supra note 7,
pt. II, ch. 2, at 3-5.
19. The advisability of continuing small systems has been disputed. Inefficiencies
of operation, waste, and expensive duplication of effort are potential hazards to a purely
local utility. A classic example of the problems inherent in the operation of a municipal
utility arose when the village of Elbow Lake, Minnesota decided to pull out of the
regional network, run by the Otter Tail Power Company, and establish its own system.
Otter Tail at first refused to deal with the new company. The FPC ultimately ordered
the larger utility to interconnect with the new local, but commented: "[W]e cannot
disagree with the Examiner's view that Elbow Lake has engaged in 'an ill-advised excur-
sion into the power business.' Given the facts of record before us, it is plain that
Elbow Lake's effort has not brought it the rewards it expected; indeed, its first year
of operations, during which it perpetuated the rates formerly charged by Otter Tail,
resulted in a financial loss. Unlike Otter Tails earlier service to Elbow Lake, Elbow
Lake's own system is of doubtful reliability, as evidenced by its presence before us now.
. . . All who have been involved-Otter Tail, Elbow Lake, and the customers of each-
have been the losers. While it is our responsibility to take all possible steps to insure
to Elbow -Lake's customers a high standard of service reliability, our terms and condi-
tions must not invite improvident ventures elsewhere." Village of Elbow Lake v. Otter
Tail Power Co., 46 F.E.P. 675, 677-78 (1971), quoted in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366, 393-94 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
20. Competition between local publicly owned electric utilities and investor owned
systems sometimes leads to attempts by the nearby investor owned utility to purchase
the local system or to attempts by cities to purchase investor owned facilities and estab-
lish municipal systems. There were seventy-two takeovers of municipal systems and
twenty-three new municipal systems formed between 1960 and 1969. The threat of
public ownership or examples of lower cost public ownership has encouraged lower elec-
tric rates in a number of cities served at retail by investor owned electric utilities. See
Hellman, Government Competition in the Electric Utility Industry (1966) (on file with
the authors); Meeks, Concentration in the Electric Power Industry: The Impact of
Antitrust Policy, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 64 (1972) [hereinaftir cited as Meeks].
sumer benefits that are the purpose behind the national economic po-
licy favoring competition.
Ability to compete is directly related to ability to minimize cost.
By far the largest portion of an electric utility's costs are incurred in
procuring bulk power supply. A utility may obtain bulk power supply
by constructing its own generation and transmission facilities, by joining
with other utilities to construct generation and transmission facilities,
or by purchasing power from another utility.2 '
While a large utility can realize economies of scale by building
a generating unit to serve only its own needs, small utilities must rely
on less efficient and less economical small generating units if they build
to serve their own needs. They can, on the other hand, realize both
cost and reliability benefits through interconnection of transmission fa-
cilities, pooling of generation facilities, and regional coordination and
planning. However, it is difficult for many small utilities to obtain ac-
cess to these cooperative activities.22
A competitive problem may also arise when utilities which are un-
able to obtain benefits of power pooling seek to purchase power at
wholesale from other utilities. When a wholesale supplier is dominant
in an area, a purchaser is limited in choice of suppliers unless the
dominant supplier will agree to transmit electric power from another
source. If he will not so agree, the purchaser may be forced to accept
contractual restrictions or wholesale prices that thwart its future ability
to compete with the wholesale supplier.
Thus, the small system problem of access to low-cost bulk power
supply is most easily met by allowing utilities access to power pools or
to transmission services. The former would permit joint ownership and
decisionmaking. The latter would permit a choice among wholesale
suppliers.
Electric Power Transmission:
Will the Function and Service Become an Obligation?
An Essential Function
Transmission is one of the three distinct functions in supplying
21. Meeks suggested three methods of taking advantage of economies of scale:
(1) smaller utilities could discontinue generation and purchase from a few large generat-
ing utilities; (2) systems could jointly construct generation and transmission facilities;
or (3) all utilities could merge to form a few giant utilities. See Meeks, supra note
20, at 75.
22. Utilities of like size tend to plan together because of anticipated mutuality
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electricity to the ultimate consumer, the other two being generation and
distribution.2" Transmission is defined as the "transportation of elec-
trical energy at high voltage from generating plants to bulk delivery
points"24 over transmission lines. A large group of such facilities is
generally referred to as a transmission system.25 A transmission sys-
tem's purpose is to augment, integrate, or tie together sources of power
supply.26 If utility systems are interconnected (or "intertied") and
coordinate their power supply operations to serve their combined loads,
such cooperation is described as a power pool.
2
Transmission-transportation of energy-when provided by util-
ity A to move energy produced by utility B for utility C is sometimes
described as "wheeling. ' 28  Thus wheeling, as contrasted with the
electrical process of transmission, includes the concept of service per-
formed for another by the owner of transmission facilities. When re-
duced to contractual terms such service will be circumscribed by limi-
tations on the quantity of power or energy wheeled, the period during
which service will be rendered, the compensation to be paid the utility
providing the service, and the points of receipt from and delivery to the
utilities involved in the transaction.
of benefits. See, e.g., Hearings on Electric Power Reliability Before the Subcomm. on
Communications and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 261-70 (1969-70) (memorandum summarizing anti-
trust problems of New England electric industry) [hereinafter cited as Power Reliability
Hearings]. It should be pointed out that, since these hearings were held, and after
much litigation and negotiation, the various segments of the New England power indus-
try have joined into a common power pool.
23. See Penn, Delaney & Honeycutt, supra note 6, at 1; 1964 POWER SURVEy,
supra note 8, at 12.
24. 1964 POWER SURVEY, supra note 8, at 12.
25. If several systems are interconnected at high transmission voltages the com-
plex is often described as an area or regional network or grid. A bulk delivery point
is an electrical connection either to a distribution center (or load center) or a whole-
sale delivery point. The term "wholesale delivery point" refers to an electrical tie to
interconnect one utility with another's transmission lines or distribution system. "Dis-
tribution point" is used more specifically to describe a point of power delivery into
the distribution system of the utility owning the transmission line or lines so connected
(i.e., vertically integrated).
26. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP., ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION AND DIsmIBunON
REFERENCE BOOK 6 (4th Ed. 1950).
27. 1970 POWER SURVEY, supra note 7, Glossary of Abbreviations and Definitions,
pt. I, ch. 24, at 6.
28. "Transportation of electricity by a utility over its lines for another utility
also includes the receipt from and delivery to another system of like amounts but not
necessarily the same energy." Id. at 8.
29. By way of example: utility A (seller) and utility C (buyer) do not have
a transmission line directly connected to each other; an electrical path is available
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These parameters are separate and distinct from the electrical be-
havior accompanying interconnected utility system operation. As the
FPC has correctly observed, a transmission system or grid "does not
differentiate between types of power from the point of view of phys-
ics"; rather, such distinction is made by contract.3" Thus transmission
is the functional integration of the production of electricity (gener-
ation and its distribution to consumers; the contractual arrangement
whereby energy is transported for others-suppliers or purchasers for
resale-is denominated as transmission service or, alternatively, wheel-
ing.
A Strategic Service
The pluralistic structure of the electric utility industry, in terms
of geography and buyer-seller relationships, typically follows a pattern
involving a relatively large and vertically integrated utility serving an
extensive geographic area. Within that area are several smaller sys-
tems-private, cooperative, or municipal-existing as "islands" within
the larger systems' sphere of operation. Frequently, such small sys-
tems are purchasers at wholesale from the vertically integrated sys-
tem. Constituting the bulk of this group of island systems are the
approximately 70 percent of the utility systems in the industry which
operate solely as distributors.31
The 1964 National Power Survey acknowledged that the "strate-
gic importance of transmission" more than justifies its expense.12  It
is the interconnection of such facilities among utility systems which
makes possible the most efficient use of area or regional power supply
facilities.3 The need for such coordination is not restricted to major
utility systems., 4
through utility B's transmission system. B, the intervening utility, will prescribe the
conditions under which it will transport energy from A to C.
Use of the nonstatutory term "wheeling" has been criticized as introducing ambigui-
ties. See, e.g., Western Mass. Elec. Co., 39 F.P.C. 723, 756-58 (1968) (White, J.,
concurring). It implies a point-to-point transfer, drawing on analogies to the transpor-
tation industry where the service rendered is physical movement. Electric energy in
utility system operations is not functionally analogous, but can be contractually so de-
scribed.
30. New England Power Pool Agreement, No. E-7690, Op. No. 775, at 31
(FPC, filed Sept. 10, 1976).
31. 1970 PoWa SUxvEY, supra note 7, pt. I, ch. 2, at 3.
32. 1964 POWER SuRvEy, supra note 8, at 27. In 1962 transmission represented
9.9% of the actual cost of electricity to the ultimate consumers. Id., Table 7, at 26.
In 1968 this figure had risen to 13%. 1970 POWER SURVEY, supra note 7, Table 1.8,
pt. I, ch. 1, at 34.
33. 1964 POWER SURVEY, supra note 8, at 27.
34. Id. at 170.
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The stated prerequisites for full coordination are (1) the exis-
tence of adequate "transmission line interties and associated equip-
ment to permit an uninterrupted and economic flow of electric energy
throughout the electric network," and (2) "intersystem planning and
the formulation of agreements between the interconnected systems to
take full advantage of all of the economic opportunities for the con-
struction and operation of facilities that will result in the lowest overall
cost of power, with equitable sharing of costs and benefits."3 5 The two
foregoing prerequisites can be conveniently described as the electrical
path and the contractual path, respectively. To perfect and perform
any proposed transaction there must be available both an "electrical
path" and a "contractual path" linking buyer and seller. The former
presumes the existence of transmission facilities and interconnections
of sufficient electrical capacity to accommodate the desired transpor-
tation and delivery of energy. The latter presumes the contractual au-
thorization of .the utility owning the transmission lines over which the
transfer is to occur. The FPC has been careful to distinguish electric
facilities (generation and transmission) to be operated under intercon-
nected conditions from marketing and pricing policies which utilities
"may adopt in selling electric power and energy in bulk at the whole-
sale level."36
The availability of transmission services circumscribes the market
place to which willing buyers and sellers can look to insure reliable and
efficient operation of their utility system, and transmission line owner-
ship can be "crucial in determining the competitive possibilities of the
industry."37  If the seller is also the transmission facility owner, then
the willingness to sell includes -the willingness to make the transmission
facilities available for the transfer and delivery to the buyer. It is typi-
cal, in this situation that the buyer and seller both market power at retail
in contiguous or overlapping areas. Thus, the seller, utility A, partici-
pates in a market in which it is both supplier at retail and supplier at
wholesale for its buyer and retail competitor. 38
35. Id. at 169. FPC and judicial analysis of costs and benefits as related to inter-
connection and utility responsibilities were set forth in Gainesville Utils. Dep't v. Florida
Power Corp., 40 F.P.C. 1227 (1968), aff'd, 402 -U.S. 515 (1971), rev'g 425 F.2d 1196
(5th Cir. 1970).
36. See, e.g., Gainesville Utils. Dep't v. Florida Power Corp., 40 F.P.C. 1227,
1232-33 (1968), aff'd, 402 U.S. 515 (1971), rev'g 425 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1970).
37. Weiss, supra note 9, at 145.
38. See Conway Corp. v. FPC, 510 F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aj)'d, 426 U.S.
271 (1976). It is exactly this result-wheeling for a competitor in order to obtain
retail competition in electricity-which is sought by the National Retail Merchants As-
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If, on the other hand, the buyer, utility B, is able to arrange for
a power supply purchase from more distant utility C, or for participation
in a generation project with C, the buyer must secure wheeling
across A's intervening transmission facilities in order to have a con-
tractual path for the transfer and delivery of this power and energy.
Should utility A decline to wheel, utility B would be foreclosed from
proceeding with the intended B-C transaction.39 Should utility A
agree, but offer B the transmission services under terms and condi-
tions so as to eliminate any prospective economic advantage to B com-
templated in the transaction with C, the result will be the same.4"
Utility B must continue to rely on A, unless B, or B and C together
can economically justify the construction of its (their) own transmission
facility to accomplish the transaction. It is in this area-the contractual
path-that the rivalries and controversies which persist within the plu-
ralistic institutional structure of the electric utility industry operate to
erect economically meaningless boundaries, wasting opportunities for
cost reduction.
Power Pools and Interconnected Operations
As "the coordinating medium"'" of adjoining systems, transmis-
sion facilities necessarily serve also as the indispensable means by
sociation (NRMA). In testimony before a congressional subcommittee, an NRMA
spokesman proposed a study of methods of promoting retail competition in the electric
utility industry, including a proposed wheeling option which could permit distant utilities
to compete for large retail loads. See STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2o SEss., ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE REFORM AND REa-
ULATORY IMPROVEMENT 660 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as ELECTRIC UTILITY
RATE REFORM] (testimony of Paulann M. Caplovitz).
39. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Village
of Elbow Lake v. Otter Tail Power Co., 46 F.P.C. 675 (1972); City of Paris v. Ken-
tucky Util. Co., 41 F.P.C. 45 (1969); Power Reliability Hearings, supra note 22, at
261-70. One problem besetting small utilities is the inability of utilities without trans-
mission facilites to participate in large generating units being planned in their area.
For example, Kansas rural electric cooperatives were unable to participate in planned
nuclear generation facilities without assurance of peaking power to meet peak loads.
Although the utilities were able to obtain assurances that they could purchase such peak-
ing power, they were unable to obtain transmission services to deliver that power. See
ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE REFORM, supra note 38, at 1401 (testimony of Charles Ross).
40. For example, after the Supreme Court enjoined Otter Tail Power Company
from refusing to wheel power for the municipal electric utility at Elbow Lake (Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)), Otter Tail charged Elbow
Lake five times its basic wheeling rate and twice the amount the company charged
other utilities for a combination of transmission services. For a discussion of the Otter
Tail-Elbow Lake history, see Brief for Petitioners at 2-12, Village of Elbow Lake v.
FPC, Civil Nos. 74-2099, 74-2100 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 13, 1974).
41. 1964 PowER StxRVEy, supra note 8, at 27.
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which those systems transact business with each other. Effective coor-
dination requires the purchase and sale of a variety of services such
as reserve generating capacity, temporary energy for emergency and
scheduled maintenance, and seasonal exchange of low-cost energy.
Much of this coordination is now effected through pools of electric util-
ity systems.
"Pool" and "pooling" are not terms of art in the electric utility in-
dustry. They are used to identify a broad spectrum of multi-utility co-
operative arrangements. At one end of the spectrum are such loosely
knit organizations as the Florida Operating Committee, which coordi-
nates interconnected operations among the major systems of peninsular
Florida. At the other end is a more sophisticated type of arrangement
among independent operating utilities that uses "centralized economy
dispatch" to conduct their physical operations as a single system. Two
leading examples are the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Power
Pool (PJM) and the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL). Other
groups of utilities such as the Southern System (Georgia and Ala-
bama) or Middle South Utilities (Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas) are
still more closely tied together as operating subsidiaries of a parent
holding company.
Each of these arrangements, to be effective, requires surrender
by every individual company to the group of some decisionmaking func-
tions and hence a certain degree of independence. With FPC encour-
agement, electric utilities have over the last half century-and partic-
ularly since World War 11I-demonstrated an increasing willingness to
give up a measure of their independence for the advantages of con-
certed planning of expansion, joint management of production and
transmission, concerted allocation of supplies, and joint determination
of cost and price levels.42
The economic advantages of interconnecting facilities and pooling
operations with neighboring electric power systems are considerable.
By calling on each other for assistance in times of emergency, intercon-
nected or pooled systems are able to reduce significantly their capital
investments in reserve generation. They are able to install larger,
more efficient generating plants either by joint construction of plants
42. This readiness to compromise the hallowed free enterprise system is not re-
stricted to the utility industry, of course. During the decade from 1965 through 1974,
over five hundred business enterprises in eighty industries or product lines were con-
victed in federal court (some companies four or five times) of violating section 1 of
the Sherman Act by voluntarily surrendering their right of independent selection of
prices, customers, or markets.
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or through the sale and purchase of excess production when a new
large plant is constructed by a single member of the pool. Joint or
coordinated planning permits optimal location and use of new generating
plants for the maximum advantage of all the interconnected systems,
rather than any individual utility. Properly coordinated operation per-
mits maximum use of the most efficient generating plants, selected on
a pool-wide rather than a system-wide basis. All systems benefit, in
terms of customer relations, from the increased reliability of service
resulting from the availability of assistance from neighboring systems.
Theoretically, at least, federal and state rate regulation sees that the
economies are passed along to the consumer."3
Despite the advantages listed above, however, formal power pools
are not strictly necessary. Each of these advantages is available among
and between systems that are simply interconnected with adequately
designed and properly engineered transmission facilities. Moreover,
simple interconnection for mutual assistance purposes predated the
formation of formal power pools in every section of the country. In-
deed, for many years transmission networks capable of handling instan-
taneous area-wide emergency assistance and response have tied all the
major utilities in the United States together in three interconnected net-
works-one covering all of the United States west of the Rockies, an-
other comprising six investor owned and three publicly owned utilities
operating throughout most of Texas, and the third covering all the util-
ity systems east of the Rockies except those in the Texas group. Not
content with the reliability enhancement and cost reduction associated
with mere interconnection, the power companies have turned increas-
ingly to formal pooling agreements. These agreements establish a
mechanism for controlling not merely the physical operation of inter-
connected systems but also the allocation, terms, and rates of their trans-
actions with each other. By 1970, when the FPC published the later
of its two national power surveys, most of the United States was blan-
keted by a network of twenty-one power pools (including PJM and
NEPOOL) established by formal pooling agreements. These formal
agreements overlap another network of thirteen "informal coordinating
organizations or power pools" (including the Florida Operating Com-
mittee).44  At least one of the informal pools-Mid-Continent Area
43. For an excellent description of the technological and economic features of
the industry as they pertain to the purposes and effects of competition and regulation,
see Meeks, supra note 20, at 69-100.
44. See 1970 POwER SuRvEY, supra note 7, pt. I, ch. 17, at 2-10.
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Power Planners (MAPP Planners)-has since been converted into a
formal pool known as Mid-Continent Power Pool (MAPP).
45
All this has been accomplished under the spur of section 202 of
the Federal Power Act.46  Although that section does not use the
words "pool" or "pooling," it does direct the FPC "to divide the country
into regional districts for the voluntary interconnection and coordination
of facilities for the generation, transmission, and sale of electric energy"
and "to promote and encourage such interconnection and coordination
within each such district and between such districts.
'47
Sometimes pooling is used loosely to refer to the simple intercon-
nection of two or more systems for the purpose of mutual assistance
and joint planning. Used in that sense, pooling can be considered as
representing the "interconnection and coordination of facilities" en-
couraged by section 202 of the Federal Power Act. When used with
reference to modem formal contract arrangements, however, pooling
has a meaning much broader than mere interconnection and coordi-
nation of facilities. Today's pooling agreement usually includes a com-
prehensive program for regulating business transactions among its sig-
natories-a concept going well beyond the sort of joint and concerted
activities expressly endorsed in section 202(a).
The Access Problem
The view that "the regulatory process should take full advantage
of opportunities to assist competitive forces"48 is consistent with the
need to enhance access to power pools and transmission services. If
utilities, especially those operating as islands within the operational
sphere of the larger, vertically integrated systems, are to have opportu-
nities to choose from among the bulk power supply alternatives techno-
logically available to other systems primarily because of their size, they
must have contractual access to such alternatives.49 Access can be
made available through voluntary arrangements to provide transmission
or pool services, through legislative mandate to provide such services,
45. This pool was formed by utilities operating in the seven state area of Montana,
Colorado, the Dakotas, Nebraska, Minnesota and Iowa. In this area, meaningful inter-
connection and coordination did not begin until the 1950's.
46. 16 U.S.C. § 824a (1970).
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. Penn, Delaney & Honeycutt, supra note 6, at 11-12.
49. "Technological advances in the generation and transmission of energy, as well
as the growth of interconnected transmission grids, have contributed to the likelihood
of wholesale load competition." Id. at 18. "Wholesale loads refer to firm power or
energy delivered to a utility which is then resold to final-use customers." Id. at 17.
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or through the introduction of new competitive sources of power sup-
ply.
The question remains whether the solution to the access problem
will come from the industry or the public. That present limitations to
access create a problem is well known. "On balance, the major factor
limiting the development of wholesale competition, given the extent of
vertical integration, is the widespread industry attitude of unwillingness
to offer wholesale firm power outside existing service areas. ' '5° As
was pointed out in the 1964 National Power Survey:
The interests of the small systems are a matter of vital concern in
this National Power Survey. Small systems must recognize the
need for obtaining their power supply from low cost sources and
there must be opportunity for them to do so.51
Moreover, the same survey expressed the concern that the enhanced
integration stemming from this increased transmission capability of the
larger utility systems "must provide attractive sources of power for the
small systems, rather than serve as a threat to their existence. '52  In
retrospect this assertion has a prophetic quality; by 1970, data available
to the FPC showed the number of small systems operating within the
industry was reduced by over 10 percent, and of the small systems still
existent, approximately 30 percent of those with generation capability
remained "electrically isolated from major transmission networks." 53
Not only was the FPC able to conclude in 1970 that the cost gap be-
tween large and small scale generation and transmission had widened
but that smaller electric systems suffered a greater economic disadvan-
tage than was the case in the late 1950's and early 1960's.
54
50. Penn, Delaney & Honeycutt, supra note 6, at 20.
51. 1964 POWER SURVEY, supra note 8, at 267 (emphasis added).
52. Id. Statements by many witnesses before the Subcommittee on Energy and
Power of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce last year made
apparent that this concern is both real and unabated and the trends in industry practice
do not promise relief. See ELECTRIC UTILrTY RATE REFORM, supra note 38 passim.
53. In the years from 1962 to 1968 the number of small systems (peak demands
of 25 megawatts or less) dropped from 3,190 to "2,842, a reduction of 348, principally
as a result of acquisitions and mergers. More than 800 of the remaining small systems
owned generating facilities, and 243 were electrically isolated from major transmission
networks." 1970 POWER SURVEY, supra note 7, pt. I, ch. 17, at 27. "Isolated" is de-
fined as not interconnected with a network of at least 500 megawatts of generating
capacity. Of these 243 isolated small systems, 229 were publicly owned utilities and
14 were privately owned. Nearly 95% of the isolated systems are publicly owned, and
operate or own more than ten times the installed capacity of the privately owned but
similarly "isolated" systems. Id. at 28-29.
54. Id. Approximately two-thirds of the systems defined by the FPC in 1970
as isolated are located in seven states: Kansas (49), Nebraska (28), Illinois (23),
Texas (18), Ohio (17), Iowa (13), and Florida (13). The balance is distributed among
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One current manifestation of this economic disadvantage is the so-
called price squeeze between the large utility supplier and the small util-
ity.55 Small systems are "under constant economic pressure to im-
prove their bulk power supply situation," 56 and recourse to joint plans
for and construction of their own bulk power systems "may result in
duplication of facilities unless suitable wheeling arrangements can be
worked out with neighboring, and generally competing systems.
'57
In a nutshell, the problem is to determine what means are avail-
able to permit small systems to achieve and maintain a competitive po-
sition vis-,.-vis major neighboring utilities for the electric sales to the
ultimate user. Where do the opportunities lie and what are the obsta-
cles to be overcome? The major opportunity for the small systems to
obtain low-cost bulk power lies with access to power pools, transmission
facilities, or the availability of transmission services. 58 The availability
of such services, either by voluntary action or under pressure of law
or public policy is the cutting edge of competition's knife.
The effects of the rivalries, controversies, and prejudices in this
capital intensive, pluralistic industry are felt most acutely by small sys-
tems. The electrical and contractual pathways essential to maintain the
competitive position of small systems in the face of increasing economic
burdens affecting the entire industry hold the key to opportunities for
improving their bulk power supply.
Federal Regulation and Policy
Access to voluntarily created contract paths for bulk power is lim-
ited by the natural reluctance of the utilities to aid a competitor.."
twenty-five states: Minnesota (11), Louisiana (8), Missouri (8), Oklahoma (8), and
twenty-one others with five or less isolated systems each. Id.
55. See, e.g., Conway Corp. v. FPC, 510 F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd, 426
U.S. 271 (1976). As of June 1976, forty-nine price squeeze cases involving utilities
in twenty-seven states were pending before the FPC. See Hearings on H.R. 15544,
Emergency Federal Power Act, Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) (testimony
of Representative John J. McFall).
56. 1970 PowER SuRvEY, supra note 7, pt. I, ch. 17, at 29.
57. Id. at 27.
58. Project financing, fuel supply, site availability, environmental considerations,
and other major factors can determine the feasibility of any program for bulk power
supply. But these elements imply utilization of new resources and facilities. Wheeling,
on the other hand, requires only greater utilization of existing facilities.
59. In testimony submitted to a congressional subcommittee, Georgia Power Com-
pany cited the "obvious reluctance on the part of a company to help its competitors"
as one objection to a legislative provision which would have required utilities to make
generating capacity in new units available to other utilities in a planning area. ELEcmrc
Present statutory mandates for industry coordination, as interpreted by
the regulators and the courts, have not produced a consistent blueprint
for cooperation. Legislation proposed in the last Congress,60 how-
ever, offered contrasting clarity and could have imposed explicit statu-
tory obligations on the industry to transmit power.
The Federal Power Commission
Parts I and II of the Federal Power Act6' both contain provisions
related to transmission facilities and transmission service. The princi-
pal focus of Part I is water resource utilization.6 2  In Part I of the act,
Congress, under its power over interstate commerce, has authorized the
FPC "[t]o issue licenses . . . for the purpose of constructing, op-
erating, and maintaining dams, water conduits, reservoirs, power
houses, transmission lines, or other project works necessary or conven-
ient" to the development of hydroelectric power sources.6"
All licenses to build hydroelectric power plants are subject to
various conditions. Some are set out by statute, and others can be esta-
blished according to the discretion of the FPC. For instance, the Fed-
eral Power Act conditions licenses on adherence to a prohibition
against "combinations, agreements, arrangements, or understandings,
express or implied, to limit the output of electrical energy, to restrain
trade, or to fix, maintain, or increase prices for electrical energy or ser-
vice."6 4 FPC power to condition a license to require transmission serv-
UTILITY RATE REFORM, supra note 38, at 1508 (Comments of Georgia Power Co. on
H.R. 12461). The FPC Legal Advisory Committee noted that neighboring utility sys-
tems are likely to be hesitant to join a pool unless there is "assurance that it will not
worsen established competitive positions." 1964 POWER SURvEY, supra note 8, at 367.
See note 201 infra.
60. See, e.g., S. 3311, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(g) (1976); H.R. 12461, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 302 (1976).
61. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-824(h) (1970).
62. Access to generation and transmission has been considered in cases before
the SEC under the Public Utilities holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79,
79(z)6 (1970). In one case, the District of Columbia Circuit required the SEC to
hold an evidentiary hearing on alleged anti-competitive aspects of denial of access by
municipally owned electric utilities to two nuclear powerplants being financed by stock
issuances to participating utilities. Municipal Elec. Ass'n of Mass. v. SEC, 413 F.2d
1052 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In City of Lafayette v. SEC, the court limited its Municipal
Electric decision to cases in which there is a "reasonable nexus between the matters
subject to its surveillance and those under attack on anticompetitive grounds," differenti-
ating between the limited SEC authority over utility securities and the broad regulatory
jurisdiction over utility operations at the FPC. City of Lafayette v. SEC, 454 F.2d
941, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Gulf States Utils. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S.
747 (1973).
63. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1970).
64. Id. § 803 (h).
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ice in particular depends upon whether the transmission facility can be
characterized as a "primary line." A primary line is defined as the line
transmitting power from the hydroelectric project "to the point of junc-
tion with the distributing system or with the interconnected primary
transmission system." 65
In Western Massachusetts Electric Co.,66 the FPC said that in
determining whether a line is "primary," it is necessary to examine the
basic purpose of the line in relation to other facilities. In that case,
the commission determined that two lines going directly from a hydro-
electric project to a switching station were primary lines, but that lines
going from the switching station to interconnected utilities were not.
The FPC required that excess capacity from the Northfield Mountain
pumped-storage project be sold and made available to other utilities
"on a just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory basis,"6 7 but found that
the transmission lines beyond the switching station were "conceived
and designed to function as an important segment of the regional trans-
mission grid."68  This finding precluded the imposition by the FPC of
a requirement that the license applicant make available transmission
service across its system for delivery of power to those utilities not di-
rectly connected to the primary lines.69 In deciding the primary line
question, the commission distinguished a case decided more than a
quarter of a century earlier, Montana Power Co. v. FPC.71 In Mon-
65. Primary lines are defined as the line or lines transmitting power from the
project "to the point of junction with the distribution system or with the interconnected
primary transmission system." Id. § 796(11) (1970).
66. 39 F.P.C. 723, (1968), aff'd sub nom. Municipal Elec. Ass'n v. FPC, 414
F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1969). A prior test-a "primary use" test-was applied to
determine whether the FPC had jurisdiction over transmission facilities in Georgia
Power Co., 37 F.P.C. 620, modified, 37 F.P.C. 986 (1967).
67. Western Mass. Elec. Co., 39 F.P.C. at 739.
68. Id. at 732.
69. For example, in FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952), the Supreme
Court approved as a license condition the requirement that the licensee transmit over
primary lines "energy generated at power plants owned by the United States" in such
amounts as will not unreasonably interfere with the licensees' use of the line. The
United States would pay the licensee for this transmission service. Id. at 19. Subse-
quently, in another suit brought by the Idaho Power Co., the Ninth Circuit held that
when the utility applied for amendment to its original license in order to construct
new primary transmission lines from its hydroelectric project, the FPC could require
already licensed transmission facilities to be made available to wheel government power.
Idaho Power Co. v. FPC, 346 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1965). In so deciding, the court
quoted the earlier Idaho Power case and said: "The Commission as 'guardian of the
public domain' has simply and reasonably required 'that existing lines be fully utilized
before additional lines are authorized. "' Id. at 960, quoting FPC v. Idaho Power Co.,
344 U.S. 17, 23 (1952).
70. 112 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1940).
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tana Power, the Ninth Circuit upheld an FPC decision that primary
lines could include extensive transmission facilities that interconnected
the applicant's service area when power from the licensed hydroelectric
project was to be carried over the transmission lines to a utility's load
center. The FPC distinguished Montana Power by noting that the
transmission lines under consideration in Western Massachusetts were
to be used to interconnect a regional transmission grid and would be
built with or without the hydroelectric facility. In a concurring and dis-
senting opinion, Commissioner Charles R. Ross questioned the validity
of such tests, although he agreed with the commission's classification
of such lines as nonprimary. He suggested that in the power situation
of today, both tests are unrealistic. Pointing out that most hydroelectric
projects are integrated with other forms of generation, he suggested
that the question whether transmission facilities would be built without
the hydroelectric project is a "chicken and egg" question of which
comes first-the transmission facility or the hydroelectric project.7 '
Part II of the Federal Power Act gives jurisdiction to the FPC over
transmission facilities and transmission and sale of electric energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce. It may by order
direct a public utility . . . to establish physical connection of its
transmission facilities with the facilities of one or more other per-
sons engaged in the transmission or sale of electric energy, to sell
energy to or exchange energy with such persons.7 2
It likewise has plenary authority to determine rates, charges, or classi-
fications pertaining to transmission or sales, as well as rules, regulations,
practices, or contracts affecting such rate, charge, or classification.73
71. Western Mass. Elec. Co., 39 F.P.C. 723, 778 (1968). While the majority
test limits the definition of "primary line," and makes questionable whether any mean-
ingful transmission facility could be classified as a primary line, the definition appears
to be consistent with the purpose of the primary line concept as described by FPC
Chairman Lee C. White in his concurring opinion in Western Massachusetts. Id. at
753, 754-55. He suggested that the 1920 primary line concept was to insure a method
of moving power from a remote site if the United States were to recapture the project
at the end of its license period. He indicated that both the government and the private
companies in 1920 wished to limit the definition of primary lines, the government be-
cause of increased recapture costs if more lines were classified as primary, and the
private utilities because of a desire to maintain the integrity of their systems. Specifi-
cally, Chairman White stated: "I conclude and this, I stress, is material to any agreement
with the majority on the primary line issue, that under our Part I licensing authority
we can impose any reasonable condition upon the utilization of the project works by
the licensee, including the power generated therefrom, as may be essential to insure that
resource is put to optimum utilization. This of course, would include the power to
order transmission of power to any other party over the facilities of a licensee's sys-
tem." Id. at 756.
72. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (1970).
73. Id. §§ 824(d)-(e).
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The only constraint on FPC authority is that its orders cannot compel
the public utility to enlarge its generating facilities or impair service
to its other customers.74 In the event of war or circumstances which
the FPC deems to be an emergency, it can order temporary connec-
tions, and the "delivery, interchange, or transmission of electric energy
as in its judgment will best meet the emergency and serve the public
interest. '
75
There have been challenges, of course, to the exercise of the
FPC's jurisdiction.7" But in 1965 it was concluded that all sales at
wholesale by a public utility which participates in an interstate power
pool are jurisdictional sales. 77  It was no longer necessary to trace
power flows across state lines to establish federal jurisdiction. Be-
cause of the increasing trend toward interstate pooling for purposes of
reliability and economy of operation79 this issue is currently of lesser
importance. The FPC, however, determined in 1967 that its juris-
diction under Part II did not encompass cooperatively owned gener-
ation and transmission electric systems financed with Rural Electrifi-
cation Administration funds.80
There is one curious and important gap in the FPC's jurisdiction
under Part II of the act. As stated *above,8' section 202(b) gives the
74. Id. § 824a(b).
75. Id. § 824a(c).
76. See, e.g., City of Colton v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 26 F.P.C. 223 (1961),
afj'd, 376 U.S. 205 (1964), rev'g 310 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1962).
77. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 33 F.P.C. 739 (1965), afl'd, 365 F.2d 180 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 972 (1966).
78. 365 F.2d at 184. In previous cases, FPC had "traced" the energy to determine
whether power used for a sale actually was in interstate commerce and therefore juris-
dictional. See, e.g., City of Colton v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 26 F.P.C. 223 (1961),
afd, 376 U.S. 205 (1964), rev'g 310 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1962).
79. See generally 1964 POWER SuRvaY, supra note 8, chs. 13, 15; 1970 POWER
Sunvy, supra note 7, pt. 1, ch. 17.
80. See Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power Dist. v. Colorado-
Ute Elec. Ass'n, 37 F.P.C. 68 (1967), ajf'd, 391 F.2d 470 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 857 (1968); Dairyland Power Cooperative, 37 F.P.C. 12 (1967). In the
Dairyland decision, however, the FPC acknowledged that legislation under which it
could exercise jurisdiction over such cooperatives would be in the public interest. In
passing, it is instructive to note that the FPC has allowed disparate rate treatment for
cooperatives (as against rates for other wholesale purchasers from investor owned sys-
tems) in partial reliance on the fact that if such lower rates were not permitted, the
resultant duplication of facilities would be detrimental to consumer interests. See St.
Michaels Utils. Comm'n v. Eastern Shore Pub. Serv. Co., 35 F.P.C. 591, 1027 (1966),
aff'd, 377 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1967); Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 33 F.P.C. 343, 34
F.P.C. 841 (1965). This rationale, while useful in the context of rate disputes, is,
of course, the very heart of the matter when applied to the issue of transmission service.
81. See note 72 & accompanying text supra.
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commission power to order "physical connection"-the construction of
transmission facilities. This section does not, however, expressly
provide for the ordering of transmission services. The FPC has
noted the absence of an express provision and has narrowly construed
its power under the section. When requested to order both an inter-
connection with and the provision of wheeling services for the city of
Paris, Kentucky, the FPC declined to require wheeling by the Ken-
tucky Utilities Company. 2 The FPC determined that it was without
authority to order Kentucky Utilities to transmit energy generated by
a third party."3 The potential transporter of power to the city was or-
dered to continue to provide wholesale service in lieu of the arrange-
ment contemplated.
Language in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States 4 apparently
affirmed the FPC's lack of authority to order wheeling under section
202(b) 85 The case involved efforts by a large investor owned electric
utility to prevent newly formed, municipally owned electric utilities
from obtaining any wholesale power. The cities were former retail
customers of the investor owned system. Otter Tail refused to sell the
cities wholesale power or to wheel power to the cities from the Bureau
of Reclamation. In addition, Otter Tail sponsored harassing litigation
which had the effect of preventing the cities from issuing revenue
bonds to finance their own generation. In denying the existence of
primary jurisdiction of the FPC in this situation, the court stated that
the FPC has no authority under Part II of the Federal Power Act to order
wheeling.8"
While FPC may not have authority, except in emergencies, to re-
quire wheeling under Part II of the act, there remains the question
whether the commission may require wheeling if it finds an anticompet-
itive situation in a power pool. Power pools-more precisely power
pooling agreements-produced by multi-party negotiation, have been
tendered to the FPC for acceptance and approval under section 202(a)
as voluntary interconnections. 87 Transmission services in such agree-
ments are generally restricted to pool transactions among the mem-
82. City of Paris v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 38 F.P.C. 269 (1967). See also New
England Power Pool Participants Coal by Wire Proceeding, 54 F.P.C. 410 (1974).
83. City of Paris v. FPC, 41 F.P.C. 45 (1969).
84. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (1970).
86. 410 U.S. at 375.
87. See, e.g., Initial Decision, Mid-Continent Area Power Pool Agreement, No.
E-7734 (FPC, Sept. 29, 1976).
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bers. s The agreements may disclaim an inferrable obligation to offer
transmission services to others.89
The FPC has refused to add to the NEPOOL power pooling agree-
ments any requirement for the wheeling of power, citing Otter Tail
as authority for this position.9" Rather, the FPC declared that the only
remedy for discriminatory treatment would be to eliminate the discrim-
ination, not require additional transmission services to include the
wheeling of power. The effect of the commission's ruling was that in-
dividual wheeling arrangements outside the pool would have to be
negotiated as they had been in the past.9' Little comfort, indeed, for
the small utility systems can be found in this regulatory view. The com-
mission, however, did leave open the question whether it could con-
dition a pooling agreement to require wheeling if it found the absence
of wheeling to be anticompetitive. 9
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Just as the federal government has a stake in proper utilization
of hydroelectric resources, it has a stake in proper utilization of nuclear
88. See, e.g., New England Power Pool Agreement, § 13, Sept. 1, 1971
[hereinafter cited as NEPOOL]; Mid-Continent Area Power Pool Agreement, § 18.02,
Mar. 31, 1972 [hereinafter cited as MAPPI.
89. Nothing in the MAPP agreement is to "be construed as obligating any of
the Participants to wheel power and energy for others not Participants under this Agree-
ment." MAPP, supra note 88, § 19.08.
90. New England Power Pool Agreement, No. E-7690, Op. No. 775, at 29 (FPC,
Sept. 10, 1976). The question of FPC authority to require wheeling as a part of a
pooling agreement was left open in the administrative law judge's initial decision in
the MAPP case. See Initial Decision, Mid-Continent Area Power Pool Agreement, No.
E-7734, at 44-45 (FPC, Sept. 29, 1976).
91. The commission's decision has been implemented by opening NEPOOL mem-
bership to all electric utilities in the area upon payment of five hundred dollars. Owner-
ship of generation or transmission facilities is not required. New England Power Pool
Agreement, No. E-7690, Op. No. 775, at 1 (FPC, Sept. 10, 1976). In comparison,
the MAPP agreement requires that members own (or lease) and control a generating
unit electrically interconnected with one or more parties to MAPP. To obtain pool
services, it is necessary that: their system normally be operated directly interconnected
with two or more electric systems, they own or control a transmission plant which is
integral to the regional transmission network (operated at 115 kilovolts or higher), their
system is important to the reliability of the interconnected systems operation, and they
participate in operating a twenty-four hour network dispatch center. MAPP, supra note
88, at H8 4.01, 4.02.
92. The commission stated: "Unless the absence of firm power wheeling from
NEPOOL is in fact discriminatory or anticompetitive . . . NEPOOL should not be
changed to include it." New England Power Pool Agreement, No. E-7690, Op. No.
775, at 32 (FPC, Sept. 10, 1976). The commission concluded that it could eliminate
a discriminatory wheeling provision but not order wheeling. It did not consider whether
it could order wheeling if it found the pooling agreement to be anticompetitive.
power for the generation of electricity. The role of the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission and, before it, the Atomic Energy Commission has,
since 1970, supplemented what regulatory authorities are provided for
in the Federal Power Act. The December 1970 amendment to the
Atomic Energy Act 98 provides for Department of Justice review and
NRC hearings on antitrust issues before NRC approval of nuclear
power plant construction or operation can be obtained.14  The NRC au-
thority to condition licenses requires it to make the determination
whether the granting of a license "would create or maintain a situation
inconsistent with the antitrust laws." 95  Upon such finding, the NRC
can issue, continue, amend, rescind, or condition a license to the appli-
cant utility. The scope of the review is not "automatically limited to
the construction and operation of the facility to be licensed," but can
include the nuclear plant's relationship to the applicant's total system
or power pool. 96 Transmission services are one of four general cate-
gories of an applicant's system operation to come under scrutiny.97
Both formal and informal license conditions have been worked out
between the Justice Department and the utilities to obviate the need
for hearings before the NRC. In proceedings before the NRC, substan-
tial modification of numerous utilities' commercial practices pertaining
93. Atomic Energy Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 2135(c) (1970).
94. Such antitrust review of applications is separate and distinct from the simul-
taneously conducted safety and environmental reviews. The antitrust review provided
under the Atomic Energy Act includes both mandatory prelicensing review and review
subsequent to construction approval if significant changes occur following such approval.
Id. §§ 2135(c)(1), (8).
95. Id. § 2135(c) (5).
96. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 6 A.E.C. 619, 620-21 (1973). However, this
standard could be sharply limited if the decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board in Consumers Power Co., 2 N.R.C. 29 (1975) is upheld. The board required
a "nexus" between the anticompetitive activity and activities under the license being
issued in order to "create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws"
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2135(c)(5). In so doing, the board rejected an argument
by the Department of Justice and by municipal and cooperative intervenors that the
existence of a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws and simultaneous activities
under the license form a basis for a "nexus." The case has been argued before the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board and appeal from the decision of the appeal
board is contemplated, since this is the first full-scale hearing on anticompetitive aspects
of a nuclear powerplant license under the Atomic Energy Act Amendments of 1970.
97. The others are: participation in the unit(s) to be licensed; coordination (in-
cluding interconnection, bulk power supply, and planning); and extant or prospective
restrictive contractual provisions. D. PENN, J. DELANEY & T. HONEYCIJTr, NRC ANn-
TRUST REVIEW OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTs: THE COrNDONINO OF LICENSES 9-14
(1976) (report prepared by members of the Economic Analysis Section of the Office
of Antitrust and Indemnity, Nuclear Regulatory Commission) [hereinafter cited as
ANTrrRusT REvIEw].
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to the availability of transmission service has been obtained. As of July
30, 1975, the department had obtained from license applicants twenty-
nine commitments for joint ownership of nuclear units, twenty-seven
commitments to wheel power for other electric systems, and twenty-
seven commitments to share reserves with other electric systems.98 In
twenty-four applications approved from 1971 through 1975, fifteen re-
quired applicants to provide some sort of transmission service as a li-
cense condition. 9  By the beginning of 1976, the Department of Jus-
tice, through its nuclear power plant license .procedure, had subjected
sixty-nine of the one hundred largest electric utilities-representing 76
percent of 1974 kilowatt hour sales-to direct antitrust review.100
In addition to requiring transmission services, many license conditions
or informal agreements require access to regional pooling,101 thus
limiting the incentive for utilities to refuse to wheel. When a compet-
itor already has access to bulk power through pooling, there is little
incentive to deny him access to bulk power through wheeling.
0 2
In determining whether activities under a license would maintain
a situation inconsistent with -the antitrust laws, the Department of Jus-
tice has examined the entire situation surrounding the applicant's sys-
tem. In so doing, it has found and resolved various problems relating
to transmission and wheeling of power. These problems include refu-
sal to wheel power, contracts with another utility requiring the second
utility to refuse to wheel power, and attempts to prevent preference
customers from obtaining access to federal power. Two cases illustrate
the problem to which antitrust inquiry is directed.
In examining an application by the Georgia Power Company for a
license for Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 2, the department stated that
the lack of applications for participation in the nuclear unit was due
to the company's past exercise of monopoly power which "appear-
[ed] to have left the other systems in the area in a position in which
they [were] unable to directly obtain access to the advantages of
98. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1975) (testimony of Thomas
E. Kauper). For agreements to provide transmission service, see Delmarva Power &
Light Co., 39 Fed. Reg. 5355, 5356 (1973); Mississippi Power & Light Co., 38 Fed.
Reg. 14877, 14878 (1973); Florida Power Corp., 37 Fed. Reg. 3782, 3783 (1972).
99. See ANTrrRusT Rnvmw, supra note 97, at 16-39.
100. Id. at 2.
101. Id. at 16-39.
102. In NEPOOL, the single exception is the wheeling of firm power. Tradition-
ally, firm power sales to distribution only systems have been made by the vertically
integrated, large utility in whose area the distributor is an "island." New England
Power Pool Agreement, No. E-7690, Op. No. 775, at 32 (FPC, Sept. 10, 1976).
large-scale nuclear power production."' 03  The department cited sev-
eral examples of the company's abuse of monopoly power. It noted
that the company had thwarted construction of Southeastern Power Ad-
ministration (SEPA) transmission facilities by promising to wheel
power to preference customers. It then imposed restrictions in its
wheeling contracts that it would not wheel SEPA power unless prefer-
ence customers promised not to install their own generation facilities
and to purchase power only from the Georgia Power Company or from
SEPA. The department pointed out that Georgia Power had instituted
suit to prevent the TVA from serving two additional counties in Geor-
gia and at the same time constructed transmission facilities into the
area, effectively precluding the possiblity that the TVA would construct
transmission lines into the area. As a result, the department recom-
mended a hearing on the anticompetitive aspects of the Georgia Power
Company's applications. 1 4 Subsequently, the department withdrew its
request as a result of various concessions gained from the company, in-
cluding transmission service over Georgia Power's facilities.0 5
In its consideration of an application by the Pacific Gas & Electric
Company for its Mendocino Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, the depart-
ment determined that the utility had monopoly power and had abused
it by various means. It found that PG&E had refused to wheel power,
thereby precluding access to alternative bulk power supply, had con-
tracted with the Bureau of Reclamation to limit preference customer ac-
cess to bureau power, and had contracted with the Sacramento Muni-
cipal Utility District (SMUD) to limit SMUD's ability to resell or wheel
power. 10 6 The department concluded that a hearing should be held.
Plans for the nuclear plant were subsequently dropped. Four years
later, however, the utility and the Justice Department reached an agree-
ment on another nuclear unit in which PG&E agreed to various li-
cense conditions, including providing transmission service for neigh-
boring utilities."'T
Preference Power and Transmission
Water resource utilization by federal agencies coupled with a con-
gressional mandate that preferrence be given to public bodies in the
marketing of electric energy has also given rise to a so-called federal
103. Georgia Power Co., 37 Fed. Reg. 16218, 16221 (1972).
104. Georgia Power Co., 38 Fed. Reg. 13048 (1973); Georgia Power Co., 37
Fed. Reg. 16218 (1972).
105. Georgia Power Co., 39 Fed. Reg. 15902 (1974).
106. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 37 Fed. Reg. 16423 (1972).
107. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 41 Fed. Reg. 20225 (1976).
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transmission obligation. The means by which that obligation is dis-
charged has created problems within the industry. Thirteen percent
of the nation's electric energy is generated by the federal government
through the Tennessee Valley Authority, the U.S. Army Corps of En-
gineers, and the Bureau of Reclamation. °8 Both TVA and the bureau
market their electric production. Three other federal power agencies-
Southeastern Power Administration, Southwestern Power Administra-
tion, and Bonneville Power Administration-market electricity from
hydroelectric projects constructed by the Corps of Engineers. 10 9
Preference in the sale of electricity generated at federal projects
is given to public bodies (including municipally owned electric utilities)
and to rural electric cooperatives." 0 All federal agencies with market-
ing responsibility have an obligation to assure that power generated at
federal projects in fact reaches preference customers. To fulfill this
obligation, a power marketing agency may contract with private utilities
to transmit power from federal facilities to preference customers or may
construct its own facilities to transport power from federal projects to
preference customers. The three power marketing agencies do not
construct their own transmission facilities unless wheeling arrangements
108. The TVA is presently the nation's largest electric utility and serves customers
throughout Tennessee and in several other adjacent states. It is the only federal agency
authorized to develop electric power from sources other than water power and is the
only federal agency authorized to fund its projects through issuances of bonds and with-
out specific congressional appropriations. Most federal hydroelectric projects are devel-
oped by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as part of comprehensive river development
plans. The Bureau of Reclamation constructs and operates hydroelectric projects and
interconnects those projects with transmission in facilities in western states and in
Alaska.
109. SEPA, SPA, and BPA, as well as the Bureau of Reclamation, are agencies
of the Department of the Interior. SEPA operates in the southeastern part of the
United States and has relied exclusively on contracts with nonfederal electric utilities
for transmitting electricity from federal projects. SPA markets power in the south cen-
tral states. BPA markets electricity from both Bureau of Reclamation and Corps of
Engineers projects in the Pacific Northwest.
110. The idea of preference initially appeared in the Reclamation Act of 1906,
ch. 1631, 34 Stat. 116, and was made more specific in the Tennessee Valley Authority
Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 831(i) (1970), and the Bonneville Project Act of 1937, 16
U.S.C. § 832(c) (1970). See also Rural Electrification Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. § 904
(1970); Water Conservation & Utilization Act of 1939, 16 U.S.C. § 590(z)-7 (1970);
Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 16 U.S.C. § 800 (1970); Flood Control Act of
1944, 16 U.S.C. § 825(s) (1970); Niagara Project Act of 1957, 16 U.S.C. § 836 (1970);
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2064 (1970); Salt River Project Act of 1922,
43 U.S.C. § 598 (1970); Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 43 U.S.C. § 617(d)
(1970); Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956, 43 U.S.C. § 620(c) (1970); Colo-
rado River Basin Project Act of 1968, 43 U.S.C. § 1554 (1970).
with nonfederal utilities are impractical.111 Two illustrations serve to
describe the process of satisfying the transmission obligation.
The extent of the transmission obligation, as it relates to the pre-
ference clause, was discussed in the attorney general's opinion in Dis-
position of Surplus Power Generated At Clark Hill Reservoir Project.'12
Power from a federal hydroelectric project had been sought by the
Georgia Power Company, a private power company with transmission
facilities, and by the Georgia Electric Membership Corporation, a
group of rural electric cooperatives with no transmission facilities. The
Department of the Interior had proposed a contract with the Georgia
Power Company under which the company would purchase power from
the federal project and would, in turn, sell a certain amount of power
to preference customers. The cooperative objected, suggesting that a
sale to Georgia Power would violate the preference clause in the Flood
Control Act of 1944.11' Instead, the cooperative proposed to buy the
power from the federal project and negotiate for transmission services
from Georgia Power or, if negotiations failed, to apply to regulatory
agencies to secure such service. The Department of the Interior noted
past refusals of the company to deal with the cooperative and congress-
ional refusals to appropriate funds for federal transmission facilities
from the project. In refusing to approve the contract between the de-
partment and Georgia Power, the attorney general linked the prefer-
ence clause to the need for transmission facilities:
Congress knew that public bodies or cooperatives whom it wished
to benefit would hardly be likely to own or control transmission
lines reaching out to a power project, and hence it could not have
intended them, in order to contract for the power, to be possessed
with those facilities in advance. 14
The attorney general noted congressional rejection of an amendment
111. A provision originally adopted in the Interior Department Appropriation Act
of 1952, ch. 375, 65 Stat. 248, and included in subsequent annual Interior Department
Appropriations Acts through fiscal year 1955 and annual Public Works Appropriations
Act through fiscal year 1977, contains such a restriction. Popularly called the "Keating
Amendment" for its author, Senator Kenneth Keating of New York, the restriction
states: "Provided, that no part of this appropriation shall be used to initiate the con-
struction of transmission facilities within those areas covered by power wheeling service
contracts which include provision for service to Federal establishments and preferred
customers, except those transmission facilities for which construction funds have been
heretofore appropriated, those facilities which are necessary to carry out the terms of
such contracts or those facilities for which the Secretary of the Interior finds the wheel-
ing agency is unable or unwilling to provide for the integration of Federal projects
or for service to a Federal establishment or preferred customer. ... Id. at 255.
112. 41 Op. ATr'y GEN. 236 (1955).
113. 16 U.S.C. § 825(s) (1970).
114. 41 Op. ATT'y GEN. at 245.
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to the preference clause in the Flood Control Act that would have dis-
allowed federal construction of transmission lines and, according to the
then secretary of the interior, would have placed the federal govern-
ment in a poor bargaining position in the sale of its power, and would
have permitted the private utilities in the vicinity of each dam to monop-
olize the power produced at the federal project."'
The attorney general concluded that the compromise bill, by
which the department could construct transmission facilities only with
congressionally approved funds, was not an attempt to circumscribe the
preference provision and make it inoperable. He suggested that sale
of federal power to a private power company with transmission facili-
ties, coupled with a refusal to sell to a cooperative without present trans-
mission facilities, would have just such an undesirable effect.
In addition to obtaining federal power preference, rural electric
cooperatives may receive loans from the Rural Electrification Adminis-
tration to construct transmission and generation facilities. 116 This is
part of an assumed federal obligation to make electricity available
to rural customers. It is both a federal obligation to assure sufficient
power is generated for use by rural systems and a federal obligation
to assure such power is received by such systems-again a federal
transmission obligation. However, the REA will not fund generation
and transmission facilities unless alternative sources are unavailable
or unreasonable."17  An example of the way in which REA trans-
mission funds may be used to market power from federal hydro-
electric projects is found in Northern States Power Co. v. Rural Electri-
ficiation Administration."8 Two privately owned electric utilities, Nor-
them States Power Company and Otter Tail Power Company, had
transmitted electricity from the Bureau of Reclamation to rural electric
cooperatives in Minnesota and South Dakota. These cooperatives
were members of the East River Electric Power Cooperative, a "super-
cooperative." East River applied to the REA for a loan to construct
transmission facilities between the Bureau of Reclamation system lines
115. Id. at 247.
116. 7 U.S.C. § 904 (1970).
117. Present REA policy is to fund generation and transmission only where no
other adequate and dependable source of power is available to consumers or where rates
from existing sources would result in a significantly higher cost to consumers than rates
from PEA-financed facilities. See RuRAL ELEcUF.ICATiON ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF AGclcuLTunE BuLL. No. 20-6, LOANS FOR GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION,
May 7, 1969.
118. 248 F. Supp. 616 (D. Minn. 1965), rev'd., 373 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967).
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and the East River members. The REA had a published policy of re-
fusing loans unless the REA administrator had certified to the secretary
of agriculture that existing contracts to provide the service were un-
reasonable and that the REA had tried and failed to have such contracts
made reasonable.' 19 After the REA found it was unable to obtain a
satisfactory and reasonable wheeling contract with Northern States and
Otter Tail, it approved a transmission facility loan to East River.
120
In addition to its general transmission obligations to make federal
power available to preference customers and to make electricity avail-
able to rural customers, the federal government, at least in the Pacific
Northwest, has assumed a responsibility to make excess capacity of
federal transmission facilities available to other utilities. 2 '
Department of the Interior
While the federal government has a direct transmission respon-
sibility when the relevant generation or transmission is paid for with
federal funds, it has an indirect obligation when the question is one
of proper comprehensive development of public lands or waterways.
For example, the secretary of the interior may grant an easement for
rights-of-way through public lands for transmission facilities. 2- He may
also promulgate appropriate regulations for such easements.' 23 In
1963, the secretary promulgated regulations124 requiring utilities ac-
quiring rights-of-way for transmission facilities through public lands to
allow the Department of the Interior to wheel power over surplus trans-
mission capacity or, at the department's own expense, to increase trans-
mission capacity to allow wheeling. A stated purpose of the regulation
was to conserve the land by avoiding duplication of facilities. In 1969,
Utah Power & Light Company applied to use two miles of federal va-
cant lands to construct a sixty-nine kilovolt transmission line and re-
quested a waiver of the wheeling requirement. The Department of
the Interior refused. The district court found, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, 2 ' that the wheeling regulations did not exceed the secretary's
119. After the district court granted a temporary injunction on the granting of
the REA loan, the court of appeals dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the
private power companies that initiated the suit had no standing to sue. 373 F.2d 686,
696 (8th Cir. 1967).
120. 248 F. Supp. at 619.
121. See 16 U.S.C. § 837(e) (1970); id. § 838(d) (Supp. V, 1975).
122. 43 U.S.C. § 961 (1970).
123. Id.
124. 43 C.F.R. § 2234.4-1(a)(5) (1963), as amended 43 C.F.R. § 2851.1-1(a)
(5) (ii) (1976).
125. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Morton, 504 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1974).
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authority, were not an unreasonable exercise of the secretary's author-
ity, and did not deprive Utah Power & Light of property without due
process of law.
Potential Modification of Historical Patterns
Although the federal government has certain authority to require
wheeling or general transmission services, that authority is far from
pervasive. Unless the transmission facility required for wheeling is a
primary line of a hydrolectric project subject to FPC licensing, is owned
by an applicant for a nuclear power plant, or crosses public lands, there
is no assurance that any federal agency has authority to order wheeling
across that line even if the utility owning that line engages in anti-
competitive practices. With the increase in power pooling, access to
transmission services may be less crucial than it has been in the past.
However, extensive power pools do not exist in all sections of the coun-
try, and the FPC has exercised only limited use of its authority to make
sure that existing power pools properly provide for all electric utilities
in an area.
This lack of exercised federal authority makes retail distributors
of electric power subject to the will of their vertically integrated compe-
titor-supplier. Various proposals have been advanced to protect these
retail distributors, including legislation to amend the Federal Power Act
and to create state and regional authorities to assume the generation
and transmission functions.
Legislation, proposed in 1976, reported out by the Senate Com-
mittee on Commerce,' 26 but never considered by the full Senate, would
have provided two types of protection for smaller utilities. It would
have granted the FPC explicit power to order wheeling or transmission
services under Part II of the Federal Power Act.127 In addition it
would have allowed small utilities to participate in regional power plans
by requiring advance publication of plans for bulk power facilities,
28
followed by some type of participation by all electric utilities in an area
on designated area planning councils.' 29 Legislation considered by the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce during the
same year suggested that the FPC should reject any contract, agree-
ment, tariff, or schedule which would result in unfair competition. 130
126. S. 3311, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
127. Id. § 201(b)(1).
128. Id. § 301(a), (b).
129. Id. § 301(c).
130. H.R. 12461, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
A more thorough and dramatic solution to the problem of a non-
generating utility's ability to compete with a vertically integrated utility
is to eliminate that vertical integration. This solution was recom-
mended in a 1970 report to the New England Regional Commission. 1 '
Citing efficiency in regional generation and transmission by a single util-
ity rather than by multiple utilities,' 32 lack of a need for vertical inte-
gration, 3' and economic and environmental difficulties in obtaining
bulk power supply, 4 the report concluded that a regional agency with
sole authority to construct generation and transmission facilities in New
England would be appropriate." 5 Governors of seven northeastern
states recently urged then President-elect Carter to consider the forma-
tion of a regional energy and development corporation which would
provide capital for new industries and for the development of energy
resources.'
36
A report to the governor of Michigan in August 1976 proposed for-
mation of a Michigan Power Authority to construct generation facilities
and sell the output on a cost to all electric utilities in the state.
3 7 Util-
ities, in turn, would sell to consumers at a Public Service Commission
approved rate, with pass-through of any increase or decrease in whole-
sale rates from the state power authority. 18s The commission which
made the recommendations was created in response to rising electric
rates and increasing difficulties in financing construction of bulk power
facilities." 9
These proposals are radical, but are nonetheless gaining some ac-
ceptance. Another solution, one which accords with historical patterns,
can be provided by power pooling, if access is afforded to all systems
needing or desirous of enhanced opportunity for coordination and sup-
plemental bulk power services. However, antitrust problems con-
131. H. ZINDER & ASSOCIATES, INC., A STUDY OF THE ELECTRIC POWER SITUATION
IN NEW ENGLAND (1970).
132. Id. at 16.
133. Id. at 18.
134. Id. at 17.
135. Similar views have been offered by persons in private industry and govern-
ment. See, e.g., TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, ELECTRIC POWER AND GOVERNMENT POL-
icy 752-53 (1948); Hearings on S. Res. 334 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Mo-
nopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 94-132 (1970),
quoted in ELECTRICAL WORLD, May 18, 1970, at 20 (remarks of S. David Freeman,
Director of the Energy Policy Staff of the President's Office of Science & Technology).
136. Wall St. Journal (Eastern ed.), Nov. 15, 1976, at 1, col. 3.
137. GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMMISSION ON ELECTRIC POWER ALTERNATIVES,
STATE OF MICHIGAN, FINAL REPORT: FACTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 45-50 (1976).
138. Id. at 59.
139. Id. at iii-v.
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cerning the preservation of competition are raised by the concert of ac-
tion or business activities permitted or condoned under such arrange-
ments.
Power Pooling: Public Interest Cooperation
or Private Interest Government?
The Role of Competition
To the extent they discourage free competition, the business regu-
lating features provided by pooling agreements among systems already
operating through interconnected and coordinated facilities may tend
to represent a significant departure from the Federal Power Act's "pur-
pose of assuring an abundant supply of electric energy throughout the
United States with the greatest possible economy and with regard to
the proper utilization and conservation of natural resources . ...
Court decisions based upon the Sherman Antitrust Act 41 have expli-
citly declared concerted allocation of customers and supplies and con-
certed fixing of the terms and prices of sale to be illegal.
142
Pooling refinements in the use of transmission facilities raise
fundamental issues. Can the organization of power pools that control
price, terms of sale, selection of wholesale customers, and allocation
of wholesale supplies be squared with the Sherman Act's ban on anti-
competitive combinations of businessmen? Can the Federal Power
Act, intended as it was to eliminate "great concentrations of economic
and even political power,"'1 3 be read as encouraging the creation of
industry committees to set prices and allocate purchases and sales in
vast regional markets? Eventually, the answers to these questions may
come from one of the FPC's first three litigated cases involving the
status and terms of pooling agreements. One of these cases, involving
the New England Power Pool, was decided by the commission on Sep-
tember 10, 1976,1'4 and is on appeal before the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 45 Another, involving
the Mid-Continent Area Power Pool, is awaiting commission review of
an administrative law judge's initial decision upholding all aspects of
140. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (1970).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
142. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
143. Gulf States Utils. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 758 (1973).
144. New England Power Pool Agreement, No. E-7690, Op. No. 775 (FPC, Sept.
10, 1976).
145. Municipality of Groton, Op. No. 775 (FPC, Sept. 10, 1976), appeal docketed,
No. 76-2003 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 8, 1976).
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the poolihg agreement.' 46 The third involves the Kentucky-Indiana
Pool found by an administrative law judge to be lawful. 14 7
In part, at least, the answers to these questions depend upon the
extent to which federal policy is to rely upon regulation rather than
competition as a means of promoting "an abundant supply of electric
energy . . . with the greatest possible economy." '148 Certainly admin-
istrative regulation touches many activities of electric power companies.
Their retail rates to consumers, their areas of retail service, and their
dealings in each other's securities are subject to varying but substantial
administrative control. Even at the retail level, however, power com-
panies have traditionally competed, in rates and service, to attract new
consumer businesses to their service areas and have frequently com-
peted for the right to serve new developments constructed in former
"dead zones" between their systems. All power companies remain
free, moreover, to compete with each other in the generation, purchase.
and sale of bulk power, the rendition and procurement of transmission
services, and the sales of wholesale power to distribution (retailer) uti-
lities.'49 It is in these three areas of wholesale and bulk power activity
that modem power pools have been busily eliminating all forms of com-
petition.
Regardless of the degree of regulation to which they may be sub-
jected, electric utilities are not exempt from the federal antitrust
laws. 5° Repeated attempts have been made in Congress to enact an
antitrust exemption for the industry, but all have been rejected.' 51
Unlike mere arrangements for coordination of the operation of
physical facilities, modem pooling agreements establish rates and char-
ges for services interchanged by pool members. Any such agreement
146. Initial Decision, Mid-Continent Area Power Pool Agreement, No. E-7734
(FPC, Sept. 29, 1976).
147. Initial decision, Electric & Water Bd. v. Kentucky Util. Co., Nos. E-7704,
E-7669, E-7937, E-8053 (FPC, filed Mar. 1, 1977).
148. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (1970).
149. See United States v. Florida Power Corp., 1971 Trade Cas. 73,637 (M.D.
Fla. 1971). Of the nearly 3500 operating electric utilities in the United States, 70%
are engaged solely in retail distribution. But this 70% of the operating systems accounts
for less than 20% of the retail sales. See 1970 POWER SURVEY, supra note 7, pt. I, ch.
2, at 2-8.
150. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); California v.
FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas,
Elec. Light & Power Co., 184 F.2d 552, 560 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906
(1950).
151. See, e.g., S. 683, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 3136, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966); Hearings on S. 3136 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966).
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must therefore be filed with the FPC as a rate schedule under section
205 of the Federal Power Act'52 and must survive any challenge under
section 206 that it is "unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or
preferential." 153 In contrast with similar orders of certain other federal
regulatory agencies, 154 the FPC's approval of a rate filing confers no
antitrust exemption. 155
The commission has had to be instructed repeatedly as to the na-
ture and importance of its broad responsibilities. One court has stated:
The Commission, while it 'has no power to enforce the Sherman
Act as such ... [and] cannot decide definitely whether the trans-
action contemplated constitutes . . . an attempt to monopolize
which is forbidden by that Act . .. ' nevertheless 'cannot without
more ignore the [act].' Thus, if it appears that Texas Eastern's
project would tend to produce monopolization of a petroleum
products market, the Commission cannot ignore that fact merely
because it is an antitrust factor and such factors have been placed
within the ken of the Attorney General.' 56
The Supreme Court has said:
Consideration of antitrust and anti-competitive issues by the Com-
mission . . . serves the important function of establishing a first
line of defense against those competitive practices that might
later be the subject of antitrust proceedings.'
5 7
In Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC,5 8 the court announced a
"theory of complementary regulation," under which "the most efficient
allocation of resources possible" is
the basic goal of direct governmental regulation through admin-
istrative bodies and the goal of indirect governmental regulation
in the form of antitrust laws . . . .,In short, the antitrust laws are
merely another tool which a regulatory agency employs to a greater
or lesser degree to give "understandable content to the broad
statutory concept of the 'public interest.' "59
152. 16 U.S.C. § 824d (1970).
153. Id. § 824e.
154. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien,
390 U.S. 238, 243 (1968) (FMC approval of steamship conference agreements under
46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970)); McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 85
(1944). See generally Note, The Antitrust Immunity Doctrine and United States v.
National Association of Securities Dealers: Stepping on Otter Tail, 28 HASINGS L.J.
387 (1976).
155. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374-75 (1973); Pennsyl-
vania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 184 F.2d
552, 566 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1950).
156. City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (citations
omitted).
157. Gulf States Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 760 (1973).
158. 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
159. Id. at 959-62, quoting Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenske
Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 244 (1968).
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This "theory of complementary regulation" finds support in an obser-
vation by the Supreme Court:
[F]requently the entire scope of Congressional purpose calls for
careful accommodation of one statutory scheme to another, and
it is not too much to demand of an administrative body that it




Application of this "theory of complementary regulation" offers
an exacting test of the FPC's regulatory acumen as the commission
passes on the propriety of the pooling agreements before it. These
pooling agreements before it. These pooling agreements present a
problem the commission has never before encountered in its rate filing
proceedings under sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act' 61
and sections 4 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act.'62 Normally, a rate
proceeding163 involves a rate set by a single selling utility for a
class of customers or by contract with a specific buyer. But the rate
schedules submitted with modem pooling agreements represent prices
that a group of selling utilities have agreed to charge and a group of
buying utilities have agreed to pay. They cover such interutility ser-
vices as seasonal power interchange, emergency energy, scheduled-out-
age (for maintenance) energy, operating reserves, economy energy,
transmission service, peaking power, and ordinary short term or long
term wholesale power supply. If antitrust policy is to be implemented
as part of the regulatory purpose of the Federal Power Act, some re-
spect must be paid the rule of per se illegality for horizontal price fixing
agreements.' 64
On the other hand, if competition and regulation are truly to com-
plement each other in this industry, a rule of per se illegality would seem
inappropriate even for price fixing.
The nature and terms of the various pooling agreements them-
selves reveal the questionable merit of a per se rule. When a pool's
dispatch of generation to load is controlled by computers programmed
160. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942).
161. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, e.
162. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717d (1970).
163. See notes 144-47 & accompanying text supra.
164. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). See also Public
Serv. Co. of Ind., Inc., 47 F.P.C. 1396 (1972), remanded sub nom. City of Huntingburg
v. FPC, 498 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1974), where the FPC apparently divided on the
regulatory significance to be given the per se rule against horizontal territorial agree-
ments.
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to use the most efficient sources (as is NEPOOL's, for example), there
is arguably an effective substitute for competition which maximizes ef-
ficiency and minimizes cost and prices. As the use of electricity fluc-
tuates throughout the pooled systems, automatic centralized economy
dispatch starts up the most efficient idle generator to meet increases
in demand and shuts down the least efficient when demand declines.
Assuming effective, cost related regulation of rates, the public gets the
benefit of the resulting improvment in fuel consumption efficiency.
Such a system of private regulation to allocate supply insures that every
buyer will turn to the least expensive source, even though prices are
uniform on a pool-wide basis.Y65 Since it also works out that the most
efficient producer in the market will make the most sales, this system
in effect preserves an important element of competition among indivi-
dual member systems. If a pool member wants to retain or increase
his participation as a producer in the market, he must maintain and im-
prove his efficiency. Hence normal competitive market incentives for
careful management, research, and innovation are preserved.
66
Furthermore, preservation of wholesale price competition in such
a pool-if possible at all-would serve no public interest. Price com-
petition promotes efficiency only when buyers are free to choose among
suppliers on the basis of price. Computerized pool-wide dispatch re-
moves this choice from the buyer and makes the choice on the basis
of cost, rather than price. If anything, this sort of market control is
an improvement on competition, for it matches the performances of
perfect competition, which rarely if ever prevails in any market. In
other words, this device of the electric utility industry seems to create
an exception to the axiom that "[tihe aim and result of every price-
fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of compe-
tition." 6 '
165. Indeed, this equalization of benefits feature of computerized economy dispatch
may give it an advantage over wholesale price competition. Such competition would
tend to impose higher prices on consumers of the systems that have the less efficient
generation and of systems that have unfavorable load characteristics (i.e., high peak
loads and low off-peak consumption), handicapping them in bidding for cheap wholesale
power.
166. "If monopolies could be made to behave as if they were perfectly competitive,
we would be able to enjoy the benefits both of large-scale efficiency and of the perfectly
working price mechanism." Lerner, Conflicting Principles of Public Utility Price Regu-
lation, 7 J.L. & ECON. 61-64 (1964); cf. Kahn, Between Theory and Practice: Reflec-
tions of a Neophyte Public Utility Regulation, 95 PUB. UTius. FORTNiGHTLY Jan. 2,
1975, at 29.
167. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927); accord,
United States v. Socony-Vacuumn Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 213 (1940).
But automated pool-wide economy dispatch involves a magnitude
of capital investment and a degree of sophistication exceeding the capac-
ity of some utilities. When such equipment is not used, establishment
of pool-wide uniform prices cannot readily be justified. The threat of
being undersold by another generating member of the pool is no longer
present as an added incentive toward careful management and in-
novation.168 Even if rates are not set at uniform levels by the pooling
agreement but are based on a formula related to each individual sys-
tem's costs, there is an inhibition on price competition not permitted in
other industries. A utility guaranteed by its neighbors that it will re-
cover at least its costs whenever it happens to make a sale has a some-
what reduced incentive to cut its costs, even if those costs reach a level
that diverts business to other generating systems.' 69
Without automated pool-wide economy dispatch, diversion of
of trade to a more efficient utility is possible only when pool members
are free to shop around for the cheapest source of supply. The trend
in more recent pooling agreements is toward establishment of a desig-
nated pool committee to allocate available power supplies among the
systems that need generation. This function of pool management is
defended as vital to control of transmission line utilization to insure that
all essential lines maintain enough unused capacity to handle emergen-
cies.
This rationalization of combined price-fixing and customer alloca-
tion ignores or subordinates the essential purpose of power pooling.
There is, in the first place, no public interest reason for pooling among
a group of utilities which are interconnected with transmission facilities
adequate to handle both emergency situations and scheduled trans-
actions essential to realizaton of nonemergency pool benefits. If, sub-
sequent to formation of the pool, transmission capacity in any part of
the pool becomes inadequate, then the pool is not performing the
essential planning and coordination functions that justify its existence
and the inevitable impairment of competition it creates.
168. "In industries with certain technical characteristics-such as the electric power
industry-regulation may be both necessary and desirable to insure an efficient alloca-
tion of resources. But, competition may still play an important role in insuring that
such industries operate efficiently. After all, where there is regulation and no competi-
tion, firms may become lazy, for they may feel that they are, in effect, guaranteed
a profit. On the other hand, if regulated firms also face some competition, they may
work harder to keep costs down, to improve the quality of their service, or to devote
sufficient resources to research and innovation." Hearings on S. 3136 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1966) (statement of Donald F. Turner,
Assistant Attorney General).
169. See Meeks, supra note 20, at 85.
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An adequate transmission network is lifeline of effective pooling.
With the assistance of regional reliablity councils sponsored by the
FPC, however, the three major interconnected networks (MAPP, KIP,
and NEPOOL) have proven themselves capable of dealing with emer-
gency situations without the existence of pooling agreements. If an
existing or contemplated pool's transmission facilities lack the capacity
to permit the addition of nonemergency loads without simultaneous ar-
rangements for collusive pricing and supplies allocation, it is extremely
doubtful that the pooling agreement offers anything in the public inter-
est over and above the reliability benefits of interconnection. In the
absence of additional benefits, the resulting impairment of cost con-
trolling competition cannot be justified, for here we are not talking about
"complementary regulation" by a governmental agency but "comple-
mentary regulation" by the members of the industry.
Pool Membership Restrictions
Just as significant, probably, as the pooling arrangements' suppres-
sion of competition among pool members is their effectiveness as bar-
riers to competition from nonmember systems operating within the
general geographical area covered by the pool's network. Since sec-
tion 202(a) of the Federal Power Act calls for voluntary interconnec-
tion and coordination, utilities establishing power pools feel free to
avoid voluntary agreement with any system outside a selected list or
class of partners. The Kentucky-Indiana Pool and the California
Power Pool (Southern California Edison, San Diego Gas & Electric, and
Pacific Gas & Electric Companies), for example, are simple agreements
by their original signatories to form the pools, with no provision for the
admission of, or participation by, any other utility. Others, like MAPP,
which is intended to be a voluntary pool of only major generating util-
ities, offer full membership and participation to only such systems as
can meet certain minimum requirements in the way of generation and
transmission equipment. At least one major pool, NEPOOL, has been
induced largely through agency and court litigation or threatened liti-
gation to open its membership to any electric utility, regardless of size
or degree of vertical integration, within its geographical area.
When membership is restricted to less than everyone in the indus-
try, another set of antitrust problems arises. 170  When satellite retail
170. "Those who control a dominant power pool or generation facility cannot re-
fuse equal access to all systems. This is an application of the general antitrust rule
that those who control an essential facility must grant reasonable access to it to all
in the trade." Address by Donald I. Baker, Director of Policy Planning, Antitrust Divi-
sion, Department of Justice, before the National Association of Regulatory Utility Com-
missioners, Seattle, Wash., Sept. 18, 1973.
distribution systems (often municipally or rural-cooperatively owned
"islands" within the service area of larger competitors) are excluded
from membership, an important potential source of new entrants into
large scale generation and transmission are effectively shut off from any
election to integrate vertically. At today's fuel prices, the economies
of large scale generation are indispensible to successful operation of
a utility. Many electric utilities are too small to undertake independent
construction of economically feasible generating projects without access
to pool coordination.
Only two or three decades ago the economics of the electric utility
industry could easily have accommodated well run municipal and rural
cooperative systems. In that earlier and simpler age, the lower fuel con-
sumption efficiency of a small, compact system's generating units was
offset by its lower transmission costs. While vertical integration offer-
ed advantages here, as it does in other industries, retail distribution sys-
tems with no generation were able to purchase wholesale power from
larger neighboring utilities, who offered reasonable terms in order to
discourage the construction of municipal or cooperative generation.
More recently, however, technological advances increasing both
the size and relative efficiency of larger generators, coupled with un-
precedented fuel price increases, have pushed the minimum feasible
investment in generation well beyond the reach of the smaller systems.
Moreover, the size of an economically attractive generating unit is now
such that its installation will create, for any but a very few large sys-
tems, an immense amount of excess capacity. While demand on a sys-
tem tends to increase at a consistent rate, this concentration of gener-
ation in large units means that supply on the system increases in large
increments that must be planned from seven to ten years in advance.
As already indicated, only a few of the very largest systems can absorb
such generation increments smoothly into their systems. A group of
suppliers organized into a pool, however, can aggregate their loads
which in combination will grow in increments large enough to accom-
modate the large increment of supply represented by today's economi-
cally sized generating units.
Pool membership is therefore essential to small systems' continu-
ation in the generation or production phase of the electric utility busi-
ness. If the policy goal of shared technology is to remain viable small
systems must be presented with opportunities to participate. The
choice to avail themselves of such opportunities should be theirs. They
should not be precluded by force of industry committee action which
would preserve to a select few the advantages of technological benefits.
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Mortality and longevity tables for small independent distribution systems
suggest that the industry no longer provides a hospitable environment
for such enterprises. Verticle integration offers at least as many advan-
tages among electric utilities as it does in other industries.
Denial of pool membership to small distribution systems operates
as an even stronger bar to small systems' entry into generation when,
as is usually the case, pool membership is essential to procurement of
the necessary backup or reserve for contemplated generation and to
knowledge of and participation in the planning of the area's future gen-
eration. A system that is not informed of, and does not participate
in, the area's planning never has a chance to have its own needs (ex-
cept perhaps as a wholesale customer) taken into consideration or to
bargain for a participation share.
The incentives toward exclusion of small systems, especially muni-
cipal and cooperative systems, from pool membership are therefore
considerable. The large generating systems that generally form pools
are naturally reluctant to allow the small systems to share in pooling
advantages that will: (1) make it easier for the small systems to com-
pete for new retail customers in previously undeveloped and unserved
territories; (2) slow down or halt the larger utilities' campaign to in-
duce the smaller systems to sell out; (3) facilitate vertical integration
that will deprive a pool member of a direct wholesale customer; and
(4) provide an incentive for cities now served by a pool member under
a franchise to establish municipal systems.
It is a well established principle of antitrust law, however, that sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act is violated by a concerted refusal of members
of an industry to provide a product or service essential to market en-
try.' 71 As the Supreme Court pointed out in Associated Press v. Uni-
ted States:
172
[T]he Sherman Act was specifically intended to prohibit indepen-
dent businesses from becoming "associates" in a common plan
which is bound to reduce their competitor's opportunity to buy
or sell the things in which the groups compete.'
73
Sometimes called the "bottleneck" principle of antitrust law, this
line of reasoning has been applied to electric utilities. In Municipal
Electric Association of Massachusetts v. SEC, 74 a proceeding under
the Public Utility Holding Company Act,175 the SEC had approved
171. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
172. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
173. Id. at 15.
174. 413 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
175. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1970 & Supp. V, 1975). This act "included Part II
stock ownership in two nuclear generating projects by the major sys-
tems that later formed NEPOOL. Approval was granted on the basis
of a finding that the joint venture arrangements gave no sponsoring util-
ity any control over any other sponsor. The SEC had summarily dis-
missed as irrelevant the complaint of a group of municipal electric sys-
tems that they had been systematically excluded from the New England
industry's joint projects. On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the commission's orders and directed the commission to con-
sider the municipals' claim that "the plans of sponsors, with the strong
economic position they would obtain by entitlement to the new low cost
power involved, [would] tend toward a concentration of control of
public utility companies." The court went on to advise the commission
that it does have authority, if appropriate, to condition approval of the
stock purchases upon availability to the municipals of an opportunity
to purchase the nuclear generation at its source. 116
While the explicit exclusion of small utilities is an obvious "bottle-
neck" problem in pooling, similar problems are created where pool
membership requirements are such that small utilities are actually un-
able to participate although theoretically eligible for membership. Com-
petition may also be lessened when small utilities are able to participate
in a pool but are less able to compete with the larger utilities because
of restrictive participation requirements.
This latter situation was involved in a case recently decided by the
FPC. In New England Power Pool Agreement,177 the commission
considered four complaints by Massachusetts and Connecticut munici-
palities 78 about the NEPOOL agreement. First, the agreement failed
to allow the Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company to
participate as a "single entity." Single entity status would have enabled
certain small utilities to have full, rather than partial benefits from the
pool. The commission rejected this complaint, pointing out that
Massachusetts Municipal was at least allowed to represent interests of
small utilities so that small utilities obtain some, if not all, pool benefits.
of the Federal Power Act, [and] was concerned with 'restraint of free and independent
competition'. . ." Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. at 374.
176. 413 F.2d at 1059-60.
177. New England Power Pool Agreement, No. E-7690, Op. No. 775 (FPC, Sept.
10, 1976).
178. While a number of municipalities which had formerly protested the agreement
withdrew their objections, the cities of Groton, Jewett City, Norwich, and Wallingford,
Connecticut, and the Second and Third Taxing Districts of Norwalk, Connecticut con-
tinued their objections and the cities of Concord, Norwood, and Wellesley, Massachu-
setts petitioned to intervene.
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Second, the municipalities complained that the agreement re-
quired small utilities to pay a proportionately higher deficiency charge
than that paid by large utilities when they failed to meet specified relia-
bility capacity. The commission required that the charge be amended
so that both large and small utilities be paid a proportionately equal
amount.
Third, municipalities objected to a requirement that a utility be
charged if its entitlement to a single generating unit exceeded 30 per-
cent of its annual peak. This requirement was placed into the agree-
ment to prevent a utility from becoming too dependent on a single unit.
The commission required deletion of this provision, holding that the
30 percent figure was an arbitrary one and citing lack of evidence that
system reliability would be impaired if the 30 percent were exceeded.
Finally, the municipalities objected to omission of requirements
for wheeling firm power over transmission facilities owned by pool
members. The commission did not require any change in the NE-
POOL agreement based on these omissions. It said that such omis-
sions were not in fact discriminatory or anticompetitive, and the com-
mision could not order the agreement changed unless it found discrim-
ination or anticompetitiveness. The FPC failed to find discrim-
ination because NEPOOL services are open to all participants. It
based its finding that the NEPOOL agreement is not anticompetitive
on three factors. First, NEPOOL does not preclude any participant
from wheeling firm power over its own transmission facilities for any
other utility. Second, NEPOOL does not alter the status quo ante as
to how a wholesale customer negotiates for wheeling. Third, NEPOOL
should increase available alternatives for access to generation and trans-
mission by small utilities.
The FPC decision in New England Power Pool Agreement distin-
guished between FPC authority to alter discriminatory provisions and
authority to alter anticompetitive provisions. While the commission de-
leted the 30 percent provision, which was clearly aimed at small systems,
and required alteration of the clearly discriminatory deficiency charge
system, it gave cursory treament to the complaint that absence of a
wheeling provision was anticompetitive. Rather than seeing its goal
as maximizing competition within a pool, the FPC viewed its role as
seeing that minimum competition is maintained. Thus, rather than ex-
amining the competitive possibilities of small non-inter-connected util-
ities, the commission noted first that no participant is prohibited from
wheeling, and second that the agreement does not alter the status quo
ante. The latter statement was made without a determination of
whether the status quo ante was in fact a competitive situation. Finally,
the commission cited increased generation and transmission options be-
cause of the power pool. This benefit accrues to systems that are al-
lowed to participate in a pool and goes to the fact of participation rather
than to the terms of participation.
A Procompetition Trend
While the FPC has limited its scope of review to maintenance of
minimal competitive requirements, the NRC has successfully injected
competition into the electric utility industry.
In 1970, amendments to the Atomic Energy Act'79 expanded and
strengthened the nuclear plant licensing role of the attorney general
of the United States under section 105 of that act8 to such an extent
that a general revision of the utilities' policies vis-h-vis small sys-
tems is being compelled by the government. Numerous electric util-
ities have made commitments to the NRC and the Justice Department
that they will make interconnection, reserve coordination, transmission,
bulk power supply, and coordinated planning services available to any
entity in their areas engaging in or proposing to engage in bulk power
production.'
When such a commitment is made by an important member of
a power pool, it creates a whole new set of factors operative in pool
planning. In at least one instance, involving nuclear plant license ap-
plications of the Duke Power Company and the Carolina Power & Light
Company, negotiations with the Justice Department and the NRC
(then the Atomic Energy Commission) over the necessity for a pre-
licensing hearing on competitive practices coincided with complete dis-
solution of a pool.
That pool had been created on July 1, 1961 by agreement among
Carolina Power & Light Co., Duke Power Co. the South Carolina Elec-
179. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-282 (1970).
180. Id. § 2135. See notes 93-107 & accompanying text supra.
181. 37 Fed. Reg. 18047 (1972). See also 39 Fed. Reg. 3846 (1974); 37 Fed.
Reg. 16218 (1972). Between the effective dates of the 1970 Atomic Energy Act amend-
ments, the Department of Justice examined seventy-five applications for nuclear power
plants. Among the practices the department found anticompetitive, and induced the
utility to abandon, were refusals to deal, requirements contracts, resale restrictions in
power supply contracts, refusals to coordinate or interconnect, denial of access to power
pools, denial of access to particular facilities, territorial agreements, refusals to sell
wholesale power on a unit basis, supply contract restrictions on use of other sources
of power supply, and efforts to prevent the development of alternative power supply
sources. See notes 93-107 & accompanying text supra.
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tric & Gas Company, and the Virginia Electric & Power Company. The
Carolinas-Virginias Power Pool (CARVA) agreement contained no
provision for the admission of any additional members, and no provi-
sion foreclosing the addition of new members by agreement. As origi-
nally filed, it was essentially a generation planning pool, with each in-
dividual system retaining ownership of, and responsibility for, each facil-
ity "within its service area." By a set of appendices added to the
agreement on December 31, 1963, however, the pool established pro-
cedures for allocating participation shares in new generation units and
established rates the pool members were to pay each other in power
supply transactions."' 2 When the pool was dissolved, its members re-
verted to bilateral contracts to handle intercompany transactions of this
sort. There is no FPC record of any reduction of reliability, impair-
ment of service, or disruption of coordination as a result of the pool's
dissolution.
Pooling Standards in Other Industries
Actually, pooling is something that occurs in a number of indus-
tries in addition to electric utilities. Patent pools, for example, have
been created in several industries.18 3  But considerable antitrust risks
accompany their use.'8 4 When a patent pool reaches the scope that
that in essence gives its participants a monopoly, then it is generally
agreed that the pool must license all applicants to use its patents without
discrimination and at reasonable royalties.8 8
Tobacco warehousemen are authorized by most tobacco growing
states to coordinate their operations through tobacco boards of trade
and, through such organizations, to actually allocate selling time among
themselves.' But they violate the Sherman Act if they exclude a
competitor or would-be competitor from membership or otherwise dis-
criminate against him.'8"
182. Carolinas-Virginias Power Pool Agreement, Dec. 1, 1963 (on file with the
authors).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931); Cutter Laboratories v. Lyophile-Cryo-
chem Corp., 179 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1949).
184. See DEPARTMENT OF JusTcE, REPORT OF THm ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NA-
TIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 242-47 (1955).
185. Id.
186. Eagles v. Harriss Sales Corp., 368 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1966).
187. American Fed'n of Tobacco Growers v. Neal, 183 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1950).
But see Danville Tobacco Ass'n v. Bryant-Buckner Associates, Inc., 372 F.2d 634 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967) (reasonable temporary restrictions applied
solely to market newcomers upheld where necessary to protect the competitive nature
of the market).
Pooling with the approval of a regulatory agency is common-place
in the transportation industry. Under the Shipping Act,18 8 and under
sections 5(1) and (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 8 ' the Federal
Maritime Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission, re-
spectively, are given power to approve agreements that in effect pool
freight operations. Once approved, the agreements are granted speci-
fic exemption from the antitrust laws.'9 0 But antitrust concepts are an
integral part of the standards these commissions are to apply in ap-
proving such pools. 9 '
The Federal Power Act's "interconnection and coordination" pro-
visions, even if treated as authorization of pooling, create a cloudy area
of the law falling somewhere between the outright exemption granted
railroads and steamship lines and the fully liable status of patent pools
and tobacco boards of trade. As already noted, it is clearly established
that the FPC has no authority to grant any antitrust exemptions to a
pooling agreement it approves as a rate schedule. Nor has the com-
mission any explicit statutory authorization to regulate or even approve
interconnection or pooling agreements as such. However, the com-
mission is directed to pass on the reasonableness of rate agreements
or rate schedules filed with it under sections 20592 and 206... of the
Federal Power Act and may order an interconnection under section
202(b).19 4  When an interconnection or pooling agreement is so filed,
"[t]he Commission can evaluate whether specific provisions of a given
interconnection agreement are consistent with the public interest with-
out negating the general policy of promoting electric systems intercon-
nections expressed in section 202(a)."'I9  This instruction leaves to
the commission a number of troublesome issues, including which, if
any, of the agreed upon conditions of interconnection and pooling can
be considered to be "charges," "classifications," "rules," "regulations,"
or "practices" that can be fixed by an order under section 206(a).
9"
Application of the full force of section 206(a) to interconnection and
pooling agreements filed as rate schedules would give the commission
the regulatory authority omitted from secton 202(a).
188. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
189. 49 U.S.C. §§ 5(1), (11) (1970).
190. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970); 49 U.S.C. § 5(11) (1970).
191. Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S.
238 (1968).
192. 16 U.S.C. § 824d (1970).
193. Id. § 824e.
194. Id. § 824a(b).
195. City of Huntingburg v. FPC, 498 F.2d 778, 784 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
196. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (1970).
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There are precedents suggesting that a close decision between com-
petition and regulation should be resolved in favor of competition. 197
This would appear to be particularly true when the regulation has been
initiated by agreement among the parties to be regulated. Moreover,
it may not be enough that the commission determine simply that a
pooling agreement's deviations from antitrust policy are outweighed by
benefits vindicating some other public interest. The commission may
also be obliged to determine that there are not alternative courses of
action that are less anticompetitive and yet will further that other public
interest.19 8
Conclusion
The transmission of power and energy between, across, and
among electric utility systems has become a commonplace feature of
the industry's operation today. Bilateral arrangements have been su-
perseded or augmented by multiparty pooling agreements. By virtue
of the importance of interconnected transmission facilities to reliability
of service, integration of power supply, and efficient resource utiliza-
tion, public policy and entreprenurial interest have coincided in a com-
mon pursuit of the technological benefits. This common bond has not,
however, been sufficient to transcend the rivalries, controversies, and
industry structure which delay, frustrate, or preclude the small utility
systems from protecting their competitive position. Access to bulk
power supply, other than a unilateral proposal offered by a larger
neighbor, can be obtained if transmission services are available from
the neighboring intervening systems. Access to and meaningful parti-
cipation in power pools is another and probably more desirable alter-
native. In order to obtain any competition in bulk power supply, it
is essential that the small system be able to establish a path between
its own system and power supply available beyond the physical dimen-
sions of the neighbor's system. Such access or contractual path-the
means to change or supplement power supply source-has not been
made generally available on a voluntary basis. The economic dispari-
ties between large and small have increased. For the small system that
either is not a pool participant or belongs to a pooling arrangement which
does not encompass transmission services, the only options are moving
against the acknowledged technological trend in the industry (installing
197. See, e.g., California Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. Stockton Port Dist., 7 F.M.C.
75, 84 (1962) ("Our national policy makes free competition the rule, and monopoly
the exception which must be justified").
198. City of Huntingburg v. FPC, 498 F.2d 778, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
small generating units locally, or constructing partially or wholly dupli-
cative transmission facilities for a limited purpose) or maintaining the
status quo by accepting a unilateral offer from the only utility contractu-
ally available as a power source, its neighbor and likely competitor. The
"voluntariness" embodied in the Federal Power Act does not reach the
nonpool, biparty arrangement, which remains the primary means by
which individual utilities can restrain their smaller rivals.
Forty years of experience under Part II of the Federal Power Act
strongly suggests this approach is debilitating, marginally useful, and,
under section 202(b), involuntary. A refusal to provide a contractual
path, if based on a claim of technical inability, is cause to speculate
on the wisdom of management as it relates to engineering foresight and
competence. A refusal to offer transmission service or to provide ac-
cess to power pools based upon economic self-interest reflects ignor-
ance of the antitrust laws and their applicability to the electric utility
industry. Policy and law continue to address the problems of reliability
and resource utilization. Attention to the commercial practices preva-
lent within the electric utility industry as they pertain to bulk power
supply have, unfortunately, fallen behind the industry's technological
march into the last quarter of the 20th century.
If small systems are to remain a viable segment of the pluralistic
industry structure, absent increased preferential treatment under state
or federal laws to offset a deteriorating economic position and absent
voluntary agreements, it is necessary either to mandate an obligation
to wheel or to eliminate the vertical integration which has resulted in
the disadvantageous position of small utilities. Full access by small sys-
tems to pooling agreements can be a useful means of achieving a
shared technology without requiring a radical departure from the exis-
ting and prospective exercise of legitimate individual rights.
However, access alone may not be sufficient unless the wheeling
or pooling arrangement itself is procompetitive rather than anticompe-
titive. The competitive nature of a pool should be resolved on an ad
hoc basis for each pool challenged before the FPC. And it is of no
assistance to the FPC to be reminded that the goal towards which it
must strive "is the protection of the public interest, as distinguished
from the private interests of the utilities," '199 or that the public interest
includes "both the broad purposes of the Act and fundamental national
economic policy expressed in the antitrust laws."2 °0
199. FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956).
200. Gulf States Utils. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 759 (1973).
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If the commission should decide, as it has apparently been as-
suming, that power pooling is a form of "interconnection and coordi-
nation of facilities" under section 202(a) of the Federal Power Act, it
may find itself in many instances discouraging, rather than promoting,
such interconnection and coordination in order to give full effect to the
public policy embodied in the antitrust laws. Some existing pools may
decide to follow the example of CARVA and disband once it is made
clear that their members must give up the competitive advantages
pooling gives them over their excluded neighboring competitiors at the
retail level.2°1
Application of the "theory of complementary regulation" imposed
upon it by the courts involves the commission in a rather peculiar balan-
cing of values. It must do more than balance the efficiency promoting
and cost reducing usefulness of competition against the economic bene-
fits of interconnection and coordination. It must also recognize two
other practical, nonlegal considerations: Do modem pooling agree-
ments really add anything to the reliability and efficiency already ac-
complished through technology and interconnection arrangements
that are not in any way dependent upon the more elaborate and
sophisticated terms of pooling? Will the need for nuclear generation
force so much of the industry into procompetitive commitments to the
Justice Department and the NRC that protection against competition will
disappear as a motive for pooling, regardless of what action the FPC
takes?
A pooling agreement that sets the prices all pool members are to
pay or receive for exchanges of power among pool members, estab-
lishes a committee to allocate power sales and purchases among the
members, discourages or limits similar transactions with non-member
systems, and excludes certain classes of competitors from the pool's
planning, reserve sharing, and other services goes well beyond the sort
of joint and concerted activity encouraged under section 202(a) of the
Federal Power Act. Such a pooling agreement is not "coordination of
facilities;" rather, it is coordination or rationalization of business deal-
201. "When systems from different segments of the industry attempt to organize
a pool, however, all such systems may want to reach one or more formal agreements
which have the effect of eliminating competition for loads. This is particularly the
case where ever there is the possibility that a participant who is also a competitor may
use the advantages derived from a pooling arrangement to undercut and take over the
present or potential customers of one or more other participants. In such circumstances,
there will necessarily be a hesitancy to enter into such a pooling arrangement unless
there is assurance that it will not worsen established competitive positions." 1964
Powaln STruvEY, supra note 8, at 367 (emphasis added).
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ings and as such has no relationship to the reliability or economies
sought by section 202. This is not a matter of antitrust law but a ra-
tional application of the Federal Power Act, a statute intended to eli-
minate "great concentrations of economic and even political power, ' 202
written by legislators interested in promoting "competition between the
privately and publicly owned utilities, '2°3 and prompted in part by an
industry practice of eliminating or absorbing municipal systems.2 °4
As has been shown, power pools do raise serious questions of the
propriety of certain utility practices. This not to suggest that every as-
pect of power pooling, or even that every power pool, is necessarily
unreasonably anticompetitive. Immediate, automatic, and involuntary
response to an emergency on a neighbor's system is essential to the con-
tribution interconnections make to system reliability. It is certainly
reasonable to expect a system that has a breakdown to pay a predeter-
mined rate for the replacement energy it needs for the first few hours
of the emergency. But the rates to be paid for, and the source of, re-
placement energy needed beyond the period of the original emergency
can be taken care of through bilateral contracts between a buyer and
seller required to compete with other buyers and sellers for that trade.
Furthermore, as previously indicated, a group of systems prepared
to make the necessary investment in the transmission and sophisticated
control equipment needed for centralized economy dispatch of energy
can reasonably be permitted to set a pool-wide price for all energy dis-
patched in that manner. Since such a pool makes its services even more
important-even indispensible-to all members of the industry, mem-
bership restrictions become even less justifiable. It also seems likely
that such a sophisticated approach to pooling is so automated and com-
puterized that many of the administrative and management problems
often cited as reasons for not broadening membership are eliminated.
Power pooling has gained industry acceptance as a means to im-
prove reliability, economic benefits, and resource utilization. Other
proposals are being made, however. The New England Region Com-
mission Study and the Report of the Michigan Governor's Advisory
Commission reflect the kind of regional and state concerns about the
ability of the pluralistic industry structure, as it has developed histori-
cally, to meet the power needs of the consumer. Both recommenda-
tions, if endorsed and carried out, would have a significant impact on
the status quo. So, too, would proposed legislative reform at the
202. Gulf States Utils. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 758 (1973).
203. 79 CONG. REc. 10379 (1935).
204. S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 215-35 (1927).
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federal level. These approaches, expanding present utility obligation
to transmit power and energy, introducing new entities for production
and transportation of electricity, or divorcing the distribution function
from generation and transmission, must logically have two conse-
quences. The electric utility industry may respond to these proposals
by increasing, voluntarily, the availability of essential transmission and
pooling services to smaller systems in order that such systems may "take
full advantage of all the economic opportunities" which technological
progress has to offer. If such response is found in the public view to
be wanting, then enhanced obligations for transmissions services will
be legislatively imposed or the consuming public will endorse the en-
try of new competitive entities in the market place of suppliers of bulk
power.

